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LETTER FROM COSO CHAIRMAN
March 1999
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is very pleased to have
sponsored the study. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997. The study provides a comprehensive analy
sis of fraudulent financial reporting occurrences investigated by the SEC since the issuance of the 1987 Report
o f the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the “Treadway Commission” Report).
We believe the research results will be extremely useful to investors, regulators, stock exchanges, boards of
directors, and external auditors. For the first time, we have a clear understanding of the who, why, where, and
how of financial reporting fraud. This knowledge, properly applied, should help to further reduce the frequency
and severity of the fraud problem in the United States.
Some of the more critical insights of the study are:
•
•
•

•
•

The companies committing fraud generally were small, and most were not listed on the New York or
American Stock Exchanges.
The frauds went to the very top of the organizations. In 72 percent of the cases, the CEO appeared to be
associated with the fraud.
The audit committees and boards of the fraud companies appeared to be weak. Most audit committees
rarely met, and the companies’ boards of directors were dominated by insiders and others with signifi
cant ties to the company.
A significant portion of the companies was owned by the founders and board members.
Severe consequences resulted when companies committed fraud, including bankruptcy, significant
changes in ownership, and delisting by national exchanges.

The study results highlight the need for an effective control environment, or “tone at the top.” The risk of fraud
is much higher in small companies. A strong CEO with significant share ownership in a small organization
needs an experienced, independent board to insure objectivity.
COSO’s mission is to improve the quality of financial reporting through internal controls, governance, and
ethics. This study validates the need for continued focus on all three areas. We believe the study will provide a
platform for those responsible for financial reporting to improve their effectiveness.

John J. Flaherty
COSO Chairman
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THE RESEARCH TEAM
This research was conducted on behalf of COSO by a
team of three academic researchers: Mark S. Beasley,
Joseph V. Carcello, and Dana R. Hermanson. All three
team members are active researchers who have previ
ously conducted research related to issues addressed
in this study. All three are Ph.D.s and CPAs who have
worked extensively as auditors with a large interna
tional accounting firm. Following are brief biographi
cal summaries for each of the researchers.

Prior to beginning his career at NC State, Dr. Beasley
served as a Technical Manager in the Audit and At
test Division of the AICPA. In that role he assisted
the Auditing Standards Board during the issuance of
the “expectation gap” statements on auditing stan
dards, which included SAS No. 53. Before joining
the AICPA, he was an Audit Manager in the Nash
ville, Tennessee, office of Ernst & Young.

Mark S. Beasley, Ph.D., CPA
Assistant Professor of Accounting
North Carolina State University
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partment of Accounting at North Carolina State Uni
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to the problem of financial statement fraud by exam
ining the relation between board of director charac
teristics and instances of financial statement fraud.
That study, published in The Accounting Review, gar
nered Dr. Beasley the American Accounting
Association’s Competitive Manuscript Award. He has
also conducted research addressing other board of
director and audit committee issues, auditor quality
issues, and the use of analytical procedures in multi
location companies. His work has been published in
journals such as the Journal of Accounting Research,
Journal o f the American Taxation Association, Jour
nal o f Accountancy, and The CPA Journal.
Dr. Beasley is the coauthor of several continuing edu
cation courses designed for accounting practitioners,
which provide technical updates on emerging audit
ing issues. In addition, he is currently serving on the
Fraud Standard Steering Task Force of the AICPA’s
Auditing Standards Board. That task force is charged
with coordinating research related to the effective
ness of SAS No. 82. Dr. Beasley is also a Fellow of
the Corporate Governance Center in the Coles Col
lege of Business at Kennesaw State University.
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the Journal o f Accountancy. Some of his research is
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cacy of the SAS No. 53 fraud risk factors in predict
ing financial statement fraud. He has also conducted
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filings by publicly held companies, and of audit com
mittee composition and various audit outcomes.
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SECTION I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
AND INTRODUCTION
Fraudulent financial reporting can have significant
consequences for the organization and for public con
fidence in capital markets. Periodic high profile cases
of fraudulent financial reporting raise concerns about
the credibility of the U.S. financial reporting process
and call into question the roles of auditors, regula
tors, and analysts in financial reporting.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) sponsored this re
search project to provide an extensive updated analy
sis of financial statement fraud occurrences. While
the work of the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting in the mid-1980s identified nu
merous causal factors believed to contribute to finan
cial statement fraud, little empirical evidence exists
about factors related to instances of fraud since the
release of the 1987 report (NCFFR, 1987). Thus,
COSO commissioned this research project to provide
COSO and others with information that can be used
to guide future efforts to combat the problem of fi
nancial statement fraud and to provide a better under
standing of financial statement fraud cases.
This research has three specific objectives:
•

•

•

To identify instances of alleged fraudulent
financial reporting by registrants of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
first described by the SEC in an Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER)
issued during the period 1987-1997.
To examine certain key company and man
agement characteristics for a sample of these
companies involved in instances of financial
statement fraud.
To provide a basis for recommendations to
improve the corporate financial reporting en
vironment in the U.S.

We analyzed instances of fraudulent financial report
ing alleged by the SEC in AAERs issued during the
11-year period between January 1987 and December
1997. The AAERs, which contain summaries of en
forcement actions by the SEC against public compa
nies, represent one of the most comprehensive sources
of alleged cases of financial statement fraud in the
United States. We focused on AAERs that involved
an alleged violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Se
curities Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the 1933
Securities Act given that these represent the primary
antifraud provisions related to financial statement re
porting. Our focus was on cases that clearly involved
financial statement fraud. We excluded from our
analysis restatements of financial statements due to
errors or earnings management activities that did not
result in a violation of the federal antifraud statutes.
Our search identified nearly 300 companies involved
in alleged instances of fraudulent financial reporting
during the 11-year period. From this list of compa
nies, we randomly selected approximately 200 com
panies to serve as the final sample that we examined
in detail. Findings reported in this study are based on
information we obtained from our reading of (a)
AAERs related to each of the sample fraud compa
nies, (b) selected Form 10-Ks filed before and during
the period the alleged financial statement fraud oc
curred, (c) proxy statements issued during the alleged
fraud period, and (d) business press articles about the
sample companies after the fraud was disclosed.

Summary of Findings
Several key findings can be generalized from this de
tailed analysis of our sample of approximately 200
financial statement fraud cases. We have grouped
these findings into five categories describing the na
ture of the companies involved, the nature of the con
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trol environment, the nature of the frauds, issues re
lated to the external auditor, and the consequences to
the company and the individuals allegedly involved.

Nature of Companies Involved
Relative to public registrants, companies
committing financial statement fraud were
relatively small. The typical size of most of
the sample companies ranged well below
$100 million in total assets in the year pre
ceding the fraud period. Most companies (78
percent of the sample) were not listed on the
New York or American Stock Exchanges.
•

Some companies committing the fraud
were experiencing net losses or were in
close to breakeven positions in periods be
fore the fraud. Pressures of financial strain
or distress may have provided incentives for
fraudulent activities for some fraud compa
nies. The lowest quartile of companies indi
cates that they were in a net loss position, and
the median company had net income of only
$175,000 in the year preceding the first year
of the fraud period. Some companies were
experiencing downward trends in net income
in periods preceding the first fraud period,
while other companies were experiencing
upward trends in net income. Thus, the sub
sequent frauds may have been designed to
reverse downward spirals for some compa
nies and to preserve upward trends for oth
ers.

Nature of the Control Environment
(Top Management and the Board)
•

Top senior executives were frequently in
volved. In 72 percent of the cases, the AAERs
named the chief executive officer (CEO), and
in 43 percent the chief financial officer (CFO)
was associated with the financial statement
fraud. When considered together, in 83 per
cent of the cases, the AAERs named either or
both the CEO or CFO as being associated with
the financial statement fraud. Other individu
als named in several AAERs include control

lers, chief operating officers, other senior vice
presidents, and board members.
Most audit committees only met about once
a year or the company had no audit com
mittee. Audit committees of the fraud com
panies generally met only once per year.
Twenty-five percent of the companies did not
have an audit committee. Most audit com
mittee members (65 percent) did not appear
to be certified in accounting or have current
or prior work experience in key accounting
or finance positions.
Boards of directors were dominated by
insiders and “gray” directors with signifi
cant equity ownership and apparently little
experience serving as directors of other
companies. Approximately 60 percent of the
directors were insiders or “gray” directors
(i.e., outsiders with special ties to the com
pany or management). Collectively, the di
rectors and officers owned nearly one-third
of the companies’ stock, with the CEO/presi
dent personally owning about 17 percent.
Nearly 40 percent of the boards had not one
director who served as an outside or gray di
rector on another company’s board.
Family relationships among directors and/
or officers were fairly common, as were
individuals who apparently had significant
power. In nearly 40 percent of the compa
nies, the proxy provided evidence of family
relationships among the directors and/or of
ficers. The founder and current CEO were
the same person or the original CEO/presi
dent was still in place in nearly half of the
companies. In over 20 percent of the compa
nies, there was evidence of officers holding
incompatible job functions (e.g., CEO and
CFO).
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Nature of the Frauds
•

Cumulative amounts of frauds were rela
tively large in light of the relatively small
sizes of the companies involved. The aver
age financial statement misstatement or mis
appropriation of assets was $25 million and
the median was $4.1 million. While the av
erage company had assets totaling $533 mil
lion, the median company had total assets of
only $16 million.

•

Most frauds were not isolated to a single
fiscal period. Most frauds overlapped at least
two fiscal periods, frequently involving both
quarterly and annual financial statements.
The average fraud period extended over 23.7
months, with the median fraud period extend
ing 21 months. Only 14 percent of the sample
companies engaged in a fraud involving fewer
than 12 months.

•

Typical financial statement fraud tech
niques involved the overstatement of rev
enues and assets. Over half the frauds in
volved overstating revenues by recording rev
enues prematurely or fictitiously. Many of
those revenue frauds only affected transac
tions recorded right at period end (i.e., quar
ter end or year end). About half the frauds
also involved overstating assets by understat
ing allowances for receivables, overstating the
value of inventory, property, plant and equip
ment and other tangible assets, and recording
assets that did not exist.

Issues Related to the External Auditor
•

AH sizes of audit firms were associated with
companies committing financial statement
frauds. Fifty-six percent of the sample fraud
companies were audited by a Big Eight/Six
auditor during the fraud period, and 44 per
cent were audited by non-Big Eight/Six au
ditors.

All types of audit reports were issued dur
ing the fraud period. A majority of the au
dit reports (55 percent) issued in the last year
of the fraud period contained unqualified
opinions. The remaining 45 percent of the
audit reports issued in the last year of the fraud
departed from the standard unqualified
auditor’s report because they addressed issues
related to the auditor’s substantial doubt about
going concern, litigation and other uncertain
ties, changes in accounting principles, and
changes in auditors between fiscal years com
paratively reported. Three percent of the au
dit reports were qualified due to a GAAP de
parture during the fraud period.
Financial statement fraud occasionally
implicated the external auditor. Auditors
were explicitly named in the AAERs for 56
of the 195 fraud cases (29 percent) where
AAERs explicitly named individuals. They
were named for either alleged involvement
in the fraud (30 of 56 cases) or for negligent
auditing (26 of 56 cases). Most of the audi
tors explicitly named in an AAER (46 of 56)
were non-Big Eight/Six auditors.
Some companies changed auditors during
the fraud period. Just over 25 percent of
the companies changed auditors during the
time frame beginning with the last clean fi
nancial statement period and ending with the
last fraud financial statement period. A ma
jority of the auditor changes occurred during
the fraud period (e.g., two auditors were as
sociated with the fraud period) and a major
ity involved changes from one non-Big Eight/
Six auditor to another non-Big Eight/Six au
ditor.
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trols may be a factor affecting the likelihood
of financial statement fraud (e.g., override of
controls is easier). Smaller companies may
be unable or unwilling to employ senior ex
ecutives with sufficient financial reporting
knowledge and experience. Boards, audit
committees, and auditors need to challenge
management to ensure that a baseline level
of internal control is present.

Consequences for the Company and
Individuals Involved
•

•

Severe consequences awaited companies
committing fraud. Consequences of finan
cial statement fraud to the company often in
clude bankruptcy, significant changes in own
ership, and delisting by national exchanges,
in addition to financial penalties imposed. A
large number of the sample firms (over 50
percent) were bankrupt/defunct or experi
enced a significant change in ownership fol
lowing disclosure of the fraud. Twenty-one
percent of the companies were delisted by a
national stock exchange.
Consequences associated with fi nancial
statement fraud were severe for individu
als allegedly involved. Individual senior
executives were subject to class action legal
suits and SEC actions that resulted in finan
cial penalties to the executives personally. A
significant number of individuals were ter
minated or forced to resign from their execu
tive positions. However, relatively few indi
viduals explicitly admitted guilt or eventually
served prison sentences.

•

The national stock exchanges and regulators
should evaluate the trade-offs of designing
policies that might exempt small companies,
given the relatively small size of the compa
nies involved in financial statement fraud. A
regulatory focus on companies with market
capitalization in excess of $200 million may
fail to target companies with greater risk for
financial statement fraud activities.

•

Given that some of the fraud firms were ex
periencing financial strain in periods preced
ing the fraud, effective monitoring of the
organization’s going-concern status is war
ranted, particularly as auditors consider new
clients. In addition, the importance of effec
tive communications with predecessor audi
tors is highlighted by the fact that several
observations of auditor changes were noted
during the fraud period.

Summary of Implications
The research team analyzed the results to identify
implications that might be relevant to senior manag
ers, board of director and audit committee members,
and internal and external auditors. The implications
reflect the judgment and opinions of the research team,
developed from the extensive review of information
related to the cases involved. Hopefully the presen
tation of these implications will lead to the consider
ation of changes that can promote higher quality fi
nancial reporting. The following implications are
noted:
Implications Related to the Nature of the
Companies Involved
•

The relatively small size of fraud companies
suggests that the inability or even unwilling
ness to implement cost-effective internal con

Implications Related to the Nature of the Con
trol Environment (Top Management and the
Board)
•

The importance of the organization’s control
environment cannot be overstated, as empha
sized in COSO’s Internal Control - Integrated
Framework (COSO, 1992). Monitoring the
pressures faced by senior executives (e.g.,
pressures from compensation plans, invest
ment community expectations, etc.) is criti
cal. The involvement of senior executives
who are knowledgeable of financial report
ing requirements, particularly those unique
to publicly traded companies, may help to
educate other senior executives about finan
cial reporting issues and may help to restrain
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senior executives from overly aggressive re
porting. In other cases, however, board mem
bers and auditors should be alert for decep
tive managers who may use that knowledge
to disguise a fraud.
The concentration of fraud among companies
with under $50 million in revenues and with
generally weak audit committees highlights
the importance of rigorous audit committee
practices, even for smaller organizations. In
particular, the number of audit committee
meetings per year and the financial expertise
of the audit committee members may deserve
closer attention.

Implications Related to the Nature of the
Frauds
•

The multi-period aspect of financial statement
fraud, often beginning with the misstatement
of interim financial statements, suggests the
importance of interim reviews of quarterly
financial statements and the related controls
surrounding interim financial statement
preparation, as well as the benefits of con
tinuous auditing strategies.

•

The nature of misstatements affecting rev
enues and assets recorded close to or as of
the fiscal period end highlights the importance
of effective consideration and testing of in
ternal control related to transaction cutoff and
asset valuation. Based on the assessed risk
related to internal control, the auditor should
evaluate the need for substantive testing pro
cedures to reduce audit risk to an acceptable
level and design tests in light of this consid
eration. Procedures affecting transaction cut
off, transactions terms, and account valuation
estimation for end-of-period accounts and
transactions may be particularly relevant.

It is important to consider whether smaller
companies should focus heavily on director
independence and expertise, like large com
panies are currently being encouraged to do.
In the smaller company setting, due to the
centralization of power in a few individuals,
it may be especially important to have a solid
monitoring function performed by the board.
An independent audit committee’s effective
ness can be hindered by the quality and ex
tent of information it receives. To perform
effective monitoring, the audit committee
needs access to reliable financial and nonfi
nancial information, industry and other ex
ternal benchmarking data, and other compara
tive information that is prepared on a consis
tent basis. Boards and audit committees
should work to obtain from senior manage
ment and other information providers relevant
and reliable data to assist them in monitoring
the financial reporting process.
Investors should be aware of the possible
complications arising from family relation
ships and from individuals (founders, CEO/
board chairs, etc.) who hold significant power
or incompatible job functions. Due to the size
and nature of the sample companies, the ex
istence of such relationships and personal fac
tors is to be expected. It is important to rec
ognize that such conditions present both ben
efits and risks.

Implications Regarding the Roles of External
Auditors
•

There is a strong need for the auditor to look
beyond the financial statements to understand
risks unique to the client’s industry,
management’s motivation toward aggressive
reporting, and client internal control (particu
larly the tone at the top), among other mat
ters. As auditors approach the audit, infor
mation from a variety of sources should be
considered to establish an appropriate level
of professional skepticism needed for each
engagement.

•

The auditor should recognize the potential
likelihood for greater audit risk when audit
ing companies with weak board and audit
committee governance.
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Overview of Report
The remainder of this report is organized as follows.
Section II provides a description of the approach we
took to identify the sample cases of fraudulent finan
cial reporting and contains a summary of the sources
we used to gather data related to each sample case.
Section III contains a summary of the results from
our detailed analysis of approximately 200 cases of
fraudulent financial reporting.
The detailed analysis of findings from this examina
tion of fraudulent financial reporting violations pro
duced numerous insights for further consideration.
Section IV highlights those insights that have impli
cations applicable to senior managers, board of di
rector and audit committee members, and internal and
external auditors. Section V provides a historical
perspective on efforts related to financial statement
fraud that have occurred since the issuance of the
Treadway Commission’s 1987 report (NCFFR, 1987).
That section highlights numerous efforts by a variety
of organizations related to the roles of external audi
tors, management, boards of directors, and audit com
mittees.

Section VI provides an overview of significant find
ings from academic research that has been conducted
since the late 1980s. This overview provides a sum
mary of key insights coming from academic litera
ture that provide additional perspective on the finan
cial statement fraud problem.
We are confident that this report. Fraudulent Finan
cial Reporting: 1987-1997, will prove helpful to par
ties concerned with corporate financial reporting. We
hope it will stimulate greater awareness of opportu
nities for improvements in the corporate financial re
porting process.
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SECTION II
DESCRIPTION OF
RESEARCH APPROACH
The first step in this research project involved the iden
tification of all alleged instances of fraudulent finan
cial reporting captured by the SEC in an AAER is
sued during the period 1987-1997. In order to obtain
detailed publicly available information about com
pany-wide and management characteristics of com
panies involved, the focus of this study is on instances
of fraudulent financial reporting allegedly commit
ted by SEC registrants that ultimately led to the issu
ance of an AAER.1
To identify instances of fraudulent financial report
ing investigated by the SEC in the period 1987-1997,
we read all AAERs issued by the SEC between Janu
ary 1987 and December 1997. From our reading, we
identified all AAERs that involved an alleged viola
tion of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act (the Exchange Act), Section 17(a) of the 1933
Securities Act (the Act), or other antifraud statutes.
We focused on violations of these securities laws given
that these sections of the 1933 Act and 1934 Exchange
Act are the primary antifraud provisions related to
financial statement reporting. Because these securi
ties provisions generally require the intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud, they more specifically indi
cate alleged instances of financial statement fraud than
do other provisions of the securities laws.2
The AAERs represent one of the most comprehen
sive sources of alleged, discovered cases of financial
statement fraud in the United States, However, such
an approach does limit the ability to generalize the
results of this study to other settings. Because the

1Publicly traded partnerships, broker-dealers, and unit investment trusts
were excluded from this study.
2We did not include frauds whose only consequence gave rise to a poten
tial contingent liability (e.g., an “indirect effect illegal act” such as a
violation o f Environmental Protection Agency regulations).

identification of fraud cases is based on review of
AAERs, the findings are potentially biased by the
enforcement strategies employed by the staff of the
SEC. Because the SEC is faced with constrained re
sources, there is the possibility that not all cases of
identified fraud occurring in the U.S. are addressed
in the AAERs. There may be a heavier concentration
of companies contained in the AAERs where the SEC
assesses the probability of successful finding of fi
nancial statement fraud as high. In addition, the cases
contained in the AAERs represent instances where
the SEC alleged the presence of financial statement
fraud. In most instances, the company and/or indi
viduals involved admitted no guilt. To the extent that
enforcement biases are present, the results of this study
are limited. However, given no better publicly avail
able source of alleged financial statement fraud in
stances, this approach is optimal under the circum
stances.
For purposes of this report, the term “fraudulent fi
nancial reporting” represents the intentional material
misstatement of financial statements or financial dis
closures or the perpetration of an illegal act that has a
material direct effect on the financial statements or
financial disclosures. The term financial statement
fraud is distinguished from other causes of materially
misleading financial statements, such as unintentional
errors and other corporate improprieties that do not
necessarily cause material inaccuracies in financial
statements. Throughout this report, references to
fraudulent financial reporting are all in the context of
material misstatements. Our study excludes restate
ments of financial statements due to errors or earn
ings management activities that did not result in a vio
lation of the federal antifraud securities provisions.
Our reading of AAERs during this period allowed us
to develop a comprehensive list of companies inves
tigated by the SEC during 1987-1997 for alleged fi
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nancial statement fraud. We read over 800 AAERs,
beginning with AAER #123 and ending with AAER
#1004. From this process, we identified nearly 300
companies involved in alleged instances of fraudu
lent financial reporting. For each of these compa
nies, we accumulated information about the specific
security law violation to ensure that the AAER in
volved an alleged violation of Rule 10(b)-5 or Sec
tion 17(a) or other federal antifraud statutes.

of time the alleged fraud occurred. In many cases,
we were also able to identify the auditor and the
national stock exchange where company stock
traded.
2. A brief description of the nature of the fraud alle
gations, including a description of how the fraud
was allegedly perpetrated.
3. The dollar amounts of the fraud and the primary
accounts affected.

SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases issued from 1987-1997 address
nearly 300 instances of fraudulent financial
reporting.

4. Identification of types of personnel and outsiders
involved in the fraud.
5. An indication of the alleged motivation for com
mitting the fraud.

Using the listing of alleged cases of fraudulent finan
cial reporting during the period 1987-1997, we ran
domly selected approximately 200 companies to serve
as the final sample to be examined in detail as a part
of this study. For each of the sample companies, we
collected extensive information to create a compre
hensive database on company and management char
acteristics surrounding instances of financial statement
fraud from our reading of (a) AAERs related to the
alleged fraud, (b) selected Form 10-Ks filed before
and during the period the alleged financial statement
fraud occurred, (c) proxy statements issued during the
alleged fraud period, and (d) business press articles
written about the sample companies after the fraud
was revealed.

6. The industry in which the company operates.
7. The geographic location of the business unit
where the alleged fraud occurred.
8. An indication of any internal control weaknesses
that presented the opportunity for the financial
statement fraud to occur.
9. A summary of the reported outcome of the SEC’s
investigation, including disciplinary action against
senior management personnel.

Data Obtained from Audited Financial
Statements

Data Obtained from AAERs
We read all AAERs issued during 1987-1997 related
to the alleged financial statement fraud for each of
the sample companies. In many cases, several AAERs
related to a single fraud at one company. From our
reading, we attempted to capture the following infor
mation:
1. A list of the specific annual (Form 10-Ks) or quar
terly financial statements (Form 10-Qs) fraudu
lently misstated and other filings with the SEC
(e.g., S-1 registration statements) that incorpo
rated fraudulently misstated financial statements.
From this, we were able to determine the length

We also obtained copies of annual financial statements
filed in a Form 10-K with the SEC. We specifically
obtained copies of two different sets of financial state
ments. The first set represented the audited financial
statements included in the Form 10-K filed with the
SEC for the fiscal period preceding the first known
instance of fraudulently misstated financial statements
for each of the sample companies (“last clean finan
cial statements”). The second set of financial state
ments represented the audited financial statements in
the Form 10-K filed with the SEC for the last fiscal
year in which the alleged instance of the financial
statement fraud occurred (“last fraud financial state
ments”).
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We read the last clean financial statements to identify
the auditor responsible for auditing the financial state
ments before the first set of fraudulently misstated
financial statements was issued. In addition to ob
taining information about the auditor, we reviewed
these Form 10-Ks to determine which national ex
change the company’s stock was listed on prior to the
fraud. We also obtained copies of the balance sheet
and income statement to have benchmark informa
tion about specific account balances (i.e., net sales,
net income, total assets, and stockholders’ equity) be
fore the fraud occurred. We reviewed the last fraud
financial statements to identify the name of the audi
tor in place and the nature of the audit opinion in the
last period in which the financial statement fraud was
allegedly in process.

Data Obtained from Proxy Statements
We obtained copies of the last (or the one available
closest to the last) proxy statement sent to sharehold
ers during the period in which the alleged financial
statement fraud was in process. We reviewed these
proxy statements to gather information about the char
acteristics of the board of directors and audit com
mittee (composition, number of meetings, etc.).

Data from Business Press Articles
To obtain information about consequences for the
company and for senior management subsequent to
the revelation of the financial statement fraud, we
performed an extensive search using the Lexis/Nexis
database of financial press articles. For each of the
sample companies, we performed a search of the
“General Business and Financial Sources” and the
“Major Newspapers” databases at Lexis/Nexis for the
period beginning with the date of the last set of finan
cial statements fraudulently misstated and ending two
years after the date of the last AAER issued by the
SEC in relation to the financial statement fraud under
investigation. We generated a listing of all articles in
these databases issued during the time period de
scribed. We used that listing to obtain approximately
50 abstracts of articles published in selected business
press sources during that time for each sample com
pany, if available. We first generated abstracts of ar
ticles appearing in The Wall Street Journal and The

New York Times. For companies not appearing regu
larly in one of these two newspapers, we also obtained
abstracts of articles appearing in Reuters Financial
Service and PR Newswire to generate a sufficient num
ber of article abstracts. For some companies, there
was a limited number of articles included in these
databases due to minimal press coverage. Thus, the
number of article abstracts reviewed was less than 50
in those cases.
We reviewed the article abstracts to capture any in
formation related to consequences of the financial
statement fraud. We captured information about
whether the company had experienced financial dif
ficulty to the point of being placed in bankruptcy, in
liquidation or conservatorship, or had been sold (in
cluding the sale of significant portions of assets). We
also reviewed the articles to determine if the com
pany was delisted from one of the national stock ex
changes and to determine if the company was the de
fendant in litigation related to the alleged financial
statement fraud. We also reviewed the articles to ob
tain information about the consequences of the rev
elation of the alleged fraud for senior management.
We captured information disclosing the resignation
or termination of senior management and informa
tion disclosing indictments, fines, or sentencings of
senior management in relation to the alleged fraud.
Finally, we captured information about whether se
nior management was named as a defendant in law
suits related to the alleged instance of financial state
ment fraud.

Data Limitations
Readers should recognize that, despite our best ef
forts to collect complete data for all sample compa
nies, the data sources used were often incomplete. For
example, AAERs were uneven in their level of dis
closure, and other sources (e.g., Form 10-Ks, etc.)
often were not available.
In addition to data availability issues, readers should
also recognize that a great deal of professional judg
ment was necessary as we collected and synthesized
the data. We believe that we have been reasonable
and consistent in our judgments, but the research ap
proach is limited by the quality of our judgments.
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SECTION III
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF INSTANCES
OF FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING:
1987-1997
We analyzed instances of fraudulent financial report
ing reported by the SEC in AAERs issued between
January 1987 and December 1997. After reading over
800 AAERs, we identified nearly 300 companies in
volved in alleged instances of fraudulent financial
reporting.1 From this list of companies, we randomly
selected 220 companies to examine in detail. How
ever, because of significant data limitations, we were
unable to include 16 of those companies in our analy
sis. Thus, the final sample examined in this study
involves 204 fraud companies. In most instances,
these fraud cases represent allegations of financial
statement fraud made by the SEC without the com
pany and/or individuals named in the AAER admit
ting guilt.
This section contains a summary of the key findings
from our reading of (a) AAERs related to each of the
204 companies, (b) Form 10-Ks filed before and dur
ing the period the alleged financial statement fraud
occurred, (c) proxy statements issued during the al
leged fraud period, and (d) business press articles
written about the sample companies after the fraud
was disclosed.

Nature of Companies Involved
Financial Profile of Sample Companies
We were able to obtain the last clean financial state
ments for 99 of the 204 sample companies. Table 1

1Generally there are multiple AAERs related to the fraud at a single com
pany.

highlights selected financial statement information for
these 99 companies.2
The sample companies are relatively small in size.
While total assets, total revenues, and stockholders’
equity averaged $533 million, $233 million, and $86
million respectively, the median of total assets was
only $15.7 million, the median of total revenues was
only $13 million, and the median of stockholders’
equity was only $5 million in the period ending be
fore the fraud began. Given third quartiles of total
assets of $74 million, total revenues of $53 million,
and stockholders’ equity of $17 million, most of the
sample companies operated well under the $100 mil
lion size range.

Most companies had assets and revenues less
than $100 million preceding the fraud.

2Our primary source o f previously issued financial statements is the Q
File database, which is a microfiche database o f selected SEC filings.
Because public companies voluntarily submit their SEC filings for in
clusion in the Q File database, financial statements for the particular
period o f interest were often not available in Q File. Thus, we were
unable to obtain fincancial statements for all sample fraud companies.
We then contacted Disclosure Inc., which is the official repository o f
SEC documents, to request copies o f financial statements we could not
locate on Q File. Disclosure Inc. provided what they had available, but
we were still unable to locate all financial statements identified. The last
clean financial statements were generally not available because (1) all
financial statements filed with the SEC were fraudulent (fraud began
before going public), (2) some companies actually never filed financial
statements with the SEC, or (3) other miscellaneous reasons that restricted
availability.

12 Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997

Table 1 - Financial Profile of Sample Companies (n=99 companies)
Last Financial Statements Prior to Beginning of Fraud Period
(in OOO’s)

Mean

Assets
$532,766

Revenues
$232,727

Net
Income (Loss)
$8,573

Stockholders’
Equity (Deficit)
$86,107

Median

$15,681

$13,043

$175

$5,012

$0

$0

($37,286)

($4,516)

Quartile

$2,598

$1,567

($448)

$1,236

Quartile

$73,879

$53,442

$2,164

$17,037

$17,880,000

$11,090,000

$329,000

$2,772,000

Minimum Value

Maximum Value

Some of the sample companies were financially
stressed in the period preceding the fraud period. The
median net income was only $175,000, with the low
est quartile of companies facing net losses. The third
quartile of companies had net income just over $2
million in the year before the fraud allegedly began.
We also analyzed income statements for the last two
years before the year of the last clean financial state
ments. Net income increased in the one-year period
from the year before the last clean financial statements
to the year of the last clean financial statements for
49 of the 99 companies. Of these 49 companies, net
income for 30 companies increased for two years in a
row. Net income decreased in the one-year period
from the year before the last clean financial statements
to the year of the last clean financial statements for
43 of the 99 companies. Of these 43 companies, net
income for 22 companies decreased two years in a
row. We were unable to observe any trends for seven
of 99 companies because they were in their first year
of operations or represented development stage com
panies with no meaningful income statement results.

To summarize, it appears that 22 companies experi
enced a downward trend in net income preceding the
first year of the fraud, while 30 companies experi
enced an upward trend. This suggests that the subse
quent frauds may have been designed to reverse down
ward spirals for some companies and to preserve up
ward trends for other companies.
National Stock Exchange Listings
We reviewed the AAERs and the “last clean financial
statements” to identify the national stock exchange
where each of the companies’ stock traded. We were
able to identify the stock exchange listing for 134 of
the 204 sample companies. As indicated in Table 2,
most (78 percent) were traded in Over-the-Counter
Markets.3 Approximately 15 percent of the compa
nies’ stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange,
and approximately seven percent of the companies’
stock traded on the American Stock Exchange.

3Over-the-Counter Markets include stocks traded on the NASDAQ Na
tional Market System, the NASDAQ Small-Cap Market, electronic bul
letin boards, pink sheets, and other situations where investors contact
dealers (brokers) when they want to buy or sell a security.
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Table 2 - Sample Companies’ National Stock Exchange Listing
National Stock Exchange
New York Stock Exchange
American Stock Exchange
Over-the-Counter Markets
Number of sample companies
with available stock
exchange information

Number of Companies
20
10
104
134

Percentage of
Companies
15%
7%
78%
100%

Table 3 - Primary Industries of Sample Companies

Industry Classification
Computer hardware/software
Other manufacturers
Financial service providers
Healthcare and health products
Retailers/wholesalers
Other service providers
Mining/oil and gas
Telecommunication companies
Insurance
Real estate
Miscellaneous
Number of sample companies with
available information on industry

Number of Fraud
Companies in
Industry
25
25
23
19
14
14
13
10
6
5
14
168

Industries for Companies Involved
We reviewed the information included in the AAERs
to determine the primary industry in which the fraud
companies operated. We were unable to identify the
primary industry for 36 of the 204 sample companies.
For the 168 companies where we were able to iden

Percentage
of
Fraud
Companies
15%
15%
14%
11%
8%
8%
8%
6%
4%
3%
8%
100%

tify the primary industry, the industries affected most
frequently included computer hardware and software
(15 percent), other manufacturing (15 percent), finan
cial services (14 percent), and healthcare/health prod
ucts (11 percent). Of course, other industries could
be more prevalent if different time periods were ex
amined. See Table 3.
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Geographic Location of Sample Companies
We reviewed the AAERs to identify the geographic
location of the companies involved in committing the
financial statement fraud. Most of the frauds were
committed at or directed from the companies’ head
quarters locations. Table 4 contains information about
the frequency of cases for states in which at least four

of the 204 sample companies were located. The states
where most of the sample companies were located
are California (16 percent of the fraud cases), New
York (11 percent of the fraud cases), Florida (eight
percent of the fraud cases), Texas (six percent of the
fraud cases) and New Jersey (five percent of the
sample fraud cases). This pattern is consistent with
centers of business activity in the United States.

Table 4 - Locations of Sample Companies
States Containing at Least Four
Sample Company Headquarters
California
New York
Florida
Texas
New Jersey
Colorado
Nevada
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Arizona
Massachusetts
States with less than 3 sample
fraud companies

Number of Sample
Companies in State
33
23
17
12
10
6
5
5
5
4
4

Percentage of Sample
Companies in State
16%
11%
8%
6%
5%
3%
3%
3%
3%
2%
2%

80

38%

204

100%
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Nature of the Control Environment
(Top Management and the Board)
Individuals Named in the AAERs
From our reading of the AAERs related to the 204
sample companies, we captured information about the
types of company representatives and outsiders named
in an AAER related to each instance of alleged fraudu
lent financial reporting. We captured all individuals
listed in any of the AAERs related to an instance of
fraudulent financial reporting, whether these individu
als were charged with fraud or charged with other
lesser violations. We were able to obtain information
about the types of individuals named for 195 of the
204 fraud companies. Even though these individuals
were named in an AAER, there is no certain evidence
that all the named participants violated the antifraud
statutes. In addition, most of the named participants
admitted no guilt of any kind.

Using the highest managerial tide for an individual,
we summarized the typical employee positions in
volved. For example, if one individual had the tides
of chief financial officer (CFO) and controller, we
report that as involving strictly the CFO position in
our reporting in Table 5. As noted in Table 5, the
senior executive most frequently named in an AAER
was the chief executive officer (CEO). The CEO was
named as one of the parties involved in 141 of 195
sample companies, representing 72 percent of the
sample companies with available information. The
second most frequently identified senior executive
named was the CFO. The CFO was named in 84 of
the 195 sample companies, which represents 43 per
cent of the companies involved. When considered
together, the CEO and/or CFO were named in 162 of
the 195 (83 percent) company frauds.

Table 5 - Types and Frequencies of Individuals Named

Individual’s Relation to Company
Chief executive officer (CEO)
Chief financial officer (CFO)
Either or both CEO or CFO involved
Controller
Chief operating officer (COO)
Other vice president positions
Board of director (non-management)
Lower level personnel
Outsiders (e.g., auditors, customers)
No tides given
Other tides

# of Companies
141
84
162
41
13
35
21
19
74
30
24

Percentage of Fraud
Cases4
72%
43%
83%
21%
7%
18%
11%
10%
38%
15%
12%

Note: We used the highest managerial title for an individual. For example, if a person served as CFO and controller, we classified that
person as CFO when presenting results in this table. This classification scheme may contribute to the lower percentages associated with
less senior positions in the firm. In addition, due to the relatively small size of fraud companies, many o f the positions, such as chief
operating officer, were not in existence at these companies, thus reducing the noted percentages for these less common positions.

4This represents the percentage o f the 195 companies with individuals named for each of the positions highlighted in this table.
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•
The CEO and/or CFO were named in an
AAER for 83 percent of the sample fraud
companies.

Obtain national stock exchange listing status
or maintain minimum exchange listing re
quirements to avoid delisting.

Audit Committee Characteristics
The company controller was named in 41 of the 195
frauds, representing 21 percent of the fraud instances.
The chief operating officer (COO) was named in seven
percent of the frauds (13 of 195), and other vice presi
dents were named in 35 of the 195 frauds (18 percent
of the cases). Lower level personnel were named in
10 percent of the cases (19 of 195 fraud instances).
Recall that our classification scheme tracked the high
est named position for an individual. Thus, the noted
percentages associated with less senior positions may
be understated. In addition, because of the relatively
small size of many of the fraud firms in this sample,
some of the noted positions (e.g., chief operating of
ficer) may not have been filled. Finally, SEC enforce
ment actions may target top executives more fre
quently than lower level employees. These factors
may contribute to the lower percentages noted for
these positions.
Individuals named in the AAERs extended beyond
company executives. In 21 of the 195 fraud compa
nies (11 percent of the cases), nonmanagement board
of director members were named. In 38 percent of
the fraud cases (74 of the 195 fraud cases), other out
siders were named, including the external auditor,
customers, and promoters of the company’s stock.

Alleged Motivation for the Fraud

We gathered information on the audit committee and
board of directors from the proxy statements, which
were available for 96 of the sample fraud companies.
The proxies used were those closest to the end of the
fraud period, so as to capture the nature of the board
and audit committee during the fraud period.
Throughout this section, the following definitions are
used:
•

Inside director — Officer or employee of the
company or a subsidiary; officer of an affili
ated company.

•

Gray director — Former officers or employ
ees of the company, a subsidiary, or an affili
ate; relatives of management; professional
advisors to the company; officers or owners
of significant suppliers or customers of the
company; interlocking directors; officers or
employees of other companies controlled by
the CEO or the company’s majority owner;
owners of an affiliate company; those who
are creditors of the company.

•

Outside director— No disclosed relationship
(other than stock ownership) between the di
rector and the company or its officers.

•

Avoid reporting a pre-tax loss and to bolster
other financial results;

•

Increase the stock price to increase the ben
efits of insider trading and to obtain higher
cash proceeds when issuing new securities;

As reported in Table 6, 75 percent of the fraud com
panies had an audit committee. These audit commit
tees generally had three members, and they were typi
cally composed of outside directors. On average,
outside directors represented over 65 percent of the
audit committee members, and nearly 70 percent of
the companies had no inside directors on the audit
committee. Nearly 40 percent of the companies had
audit committees composed entirely of outside direc
tors. Overall, the audit committees appear to be rea
sonably independent.

•

Cover up assets misappropriated for personal
gain; and

The average number of audit committee meetings per
year was 1.8, with a median of 1.0. Only 44 percent

In several instances, the AAERs provided some dis
cussion of the alleged motivation for why company
representatives committed the fraud. The most com
monly cited reasons include committing the fraud to:
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of the companies with an audit committee had a com
mittee that met at least twice during the year. Some
may question whether audit committees that meet only
one or two times per year are functioning effectively.
In addition, 12 companies had audit committees that
did not meet at all, a clear sign of audit committees
existing in name only.
Most of the audit committee members (65 percent)
did not appear to be experts in accounting or finance.
On an average basis, only 35 percent (median 33 per
cent) of the audit committee members were certified
as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), or Certified
Financial Analyst (CFA), or had current or prior work

experience in serving as a CFO, VP of finance, con
troller, treasurer, auditor, banker, investment banker,
financial consultant, investment manager, or venture
capitalist.
Finally, the audit committee disclosures provided evi
dence of an internal audit function approximately 20
percent of the time. Such a percentage appears rea
sonable in light of the small size of the sample com
panies.
Most of the fraud companies either had no
audit committee or had an audit committee
that met less than twice per year.

Table 6 - Audit Committee Profile
# of Companies
with Information

Result

Existence of audit committee

96

75% had audit committee

Number of audit committee members

71

Mean = 3.0

Type of audit committee member:
Insider
Gray

71

Audit committees with no insiders

71

69%

Audit committees composed entirely of
outside directors

71

38%

Number of audit committee meetings per year

66

Mean =1.8
Median = 1.0

Audit committees meeting at least twice per year

66

44%

Percentage of audit committee members with
accounting or finance expertise

71

Mean = 35%

Audit committee disclosures provide evidence
of an internal audit function

63

19% mentioned internal
audit function

Item

Mean =11%
Mean = 21%
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Board Characteristics
As shown in Table 7, the average board of directors
was composed of seven members. Unlike the audit
committees, the boards tended to be dominated by
insiders and gray directors (60 percent on average).
The most common types of gray directors were former
company officers, company legal counsel, consultants,
officers of significant customers or suppliers, and rela
tives of management. The outside directors most com
monly were employed as senior executives of other
companies.
On average, the board members were approximately
50 years old and had served on the fraud company’s
board for about five years. The directors of these
companies rarely served as outside or gray directors
of other companies (mean other directorships of 0.5
per board). In fact, almost 40 percent of the fraud
companies had boards where not one member served
as an outside or gray director on another board. Over
all, the directors appear to have limited experience as
corporate monitors.

The directors and officers typically had a significant
financial stake in the company. The directors and
officers’ stock ownership of the companies averaged
32 percent, with a median of 27 percent. The two
largest individual stockholders who serve on the board
or as an officer own an average of 26 percent (20 per
cent median) of the stock of the company. When con
sidering these two findings together, about 80 per
cent of the ownership held by officers and directors is
concentrated in the hands of the two largest stock
holders serving on the board or serving as an officer.
On an average (median) basis, the CEO/president
personally owned 17 percent (12 percent) of company
shares outstanding.
Finally, the boards generally met six or seven times
per year. Over half of the boards met between four
and six times.
The boards generally were dominated by insid
ers or gray directors with significant equity own
ership and apparently little experience serving
as directors of other companies.
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Table 7 - Board of Directors Profile
# of Companies
with Information

Result

Number of board members

96

Mean = 7.1

Type of board member:
Insider
Gray

96

Types of gray directors:
Former company officer
Company legal counsel
Consultant to company
Officer of significant customer
Officer of significant supplier
Relative of management

68

Positions held by outside directors:
Senior executive of another company
Retired/former executive
Attorney
Consultant

96

Director age

92

Mean = 51 years

Director tenure with board

90

Mean = 5.4 years

Other outside or gray directorships held by
any member of the board

95

Mean = 0.5 per board

Boards where not one member served as an
outside or gray director on another board

95

39%

Percentage stock ownership by directors
and officers

96

Mean = 32%
Median = 27%

Percentage stock ownership by CEO
or president

96

Mean = 17%
Median = 12%

Percentage stock ownership by two largest
individual holders also serving on the board
or as a corporate officer

96

Mean = 26%
Median = 20%

Number of board meetings per year

93

Mean = 6.8

Item

Mean = 43%
Mean = 17%
22%
17%
16%
13%
12%
9%
47%
8%
7%
7%
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Director and Officer Relationships and
Personal Factors
We also examined the proxy statements for evidence
of personal relationships among the directors and of
ficers, as well as potentially conflicting job duties.
As reported in Table 8, and consistent with the small
size of the sample companies, family relationships
among various directors and/or officers were disclosed
for nearly 40 percent of the companies. When present,
there generally were two such relationships per com
pany.
The CEO and board chair were the same person in 66
percent of the cases. The board chair was a non-com
pany executive in 16 percent of cases. The company
founder and the current CEO were the same person
or the original CEO/president was still in place in 45
percent of the companies.

We examined the officers’ titles for evidence of any
incompatible job functions held by one individual.
For example, authorization, asset custody, and record
keeping should be kept separate when possible to
maintain proper segregation of duties. In over 20 per
cent of the cases, it appeared that senior executives
held incompatible job functions (e.g., CEO and CFO,
or COO and controller).
It does not appear that the sample companies repre
sent tightly held family businesses given that the num
ber of common shares held by non-officers or non
directors averaged 8.5 million shares (median of 4.3
million shares).
Family relationships among directors and/or
officers were fairly common. Also, the
founder and current CEO were the same per
son or the original CEO/president was still in
place in nearly half of the companies.

Table 8 - Director and Officer Relationships and Personal Factors
# of Companies
with Information

Result

Family relationships among directors
and/or officers were disclosed

96

38%

If present, number of family relationships

36

Mean = 2.3
per company

CEO/president and board chair were
same person

96

66%

Non-company executive was board chair

96

16%

Founder and current CEO were same person
or the original CEO/ president was still in place

96

45%

Evidence of incompatible job functions held
by officers (e.g., CEO and CFO, or COO and
controller)

96

21%

Item
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During our review of the proxy statements, we also
noted the following miscellaneous events that may
provide some indication of a higher likelihood for
fraud:
•

Officers and directors faced prior or current
legal/regulatory actions against them person
ally in eight percent of the cases (eight out of
96 companies).

•

At least one board member or officer had re
signed within the prior two years in nine per
cent of the cases (nine out of 96 companies).
In seven of those nine cases, the resignations
involved multiple officers and directors.

•

Information about the CFO’s background was
provided for 44 companies (where we also
had the name of the audit firm). In five of 44
companies (11 percent), the CFO had previ
ous experience with the company’s audit firm
immediately prior to joining the company.

•

Material loans from the company to officers
or directors outside the normal course of busi
ness occurred for three percent of the compa
nies (three of 96 companies).

Nature of the Frauds
Total Amount of the Fraud
In an attempt to obtain a judgmental measure of the
typical size of the financial statement frauds, we ac
cumulated information from the AAERs that provided
some indication of the amounts involved. In many
cases, the AAERs did not disclose the dollar amounts
involved. As a result, we were only able to obtain
some measure of the dollar amounts involved for 148
of the 204 sample companies. As reported in Table 9,
on an overall cumulative basis, the average fraud in
volved $25 million of cumulative misstatement or
misappropriation over the fraud period, while the
median fraud involved $4.1 million. The smallest
fraud was $20,000 while the largest totaled $910 mil
lion. The first and third quartiles of cumulative mis
statements or misappropriations were $1.6 million and
$11.76 million, respectively.5
On an overall cumulative basis, the average
fraud was $25 million, while the median fraud
was $4.1 million.

5Ideally, we would report misstatement information in percentage rather
than dollar terms. However, we are unable to report percentages for most
companies due to the limited amount o f information provided in the
AAERs about dollar misstatements and the lack o f available financial
statements for all fraud periods (which reflect misstated values anyway)
for those companies with related AAERs reporting misstatement infor
mation.

Table 9 - Cumulative $ Amount of Fraud for a Single Company

Cumulative Amount of
Fraud for a Single Company
Minimum = $20,000
Maximum = $910 million
1stquartile = $1.6 million
3rd quartile = $11.76 million

# of Sample
Companies
with
Information

Mean
Cumulative
Misstatement or
Misappropriation
(in $ millions)

Median
Cumulative
Misstatement or
Misappropriation
(in $ millions)

148

$25.0

$4.1
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Unfortunately, the AAERs do not consistently report
the dollar amounts involved in each fraud. In some
instances, the AAERs report the dollar amounts of
the fraud by noting the extent that assets were mis
stated. In other cases, the AAERs report the amounts
that either revenues, net income, or pre-tax income
were misstated. We used the type of fraud and the
nature of the data presented in the AAER to develop
the most appropriate measure of the fraud amount
(e.g., asset frauds expressed as misstatements of as
sets, etc.). Information about the amounts involved
by fraud type for 143 companies is provided in Table
10.
Asset misstatements averaged $39.4 million, with a
median of $4.9 million. The average misstatements
of revenues, pre-tax income, and net income ranged
from $9.2 million to $16.5 million, with medians rang
ing from $2.3 million to $5.4 million. The average
misappropriation of assets was $77.5 million, while
the median misappropriation of assets was $2.0 mil
lion.

While Tables 9 and 10 provide information about the
average and median cumulative effects of the fraud
over the entire fraud period, Table 11 provides an
overview of the largest income misstatement in a
single period. For each of the companies where the
related AAERs reported misstatement information as
a function of pre-tax income or net income, we iden
tified the largest single-year or single-quarter misstate
ment over that company’s fraud period. For the
AAERs providing misstatement information relative
to pre-tax income (48 companies), the average of the
largest pre-tax misstatement in a single period was
$7.1 million, with a median single period pre-tax mis
statement of $3.2 million. For AAERs reporting mis
statements as a function of net income (41 compa
nies), the average largest single period misstatement
of net income was $9.9 million with median single
period net income misstatement of $2.2 million.

Table 10 - Amount of $ Misstatements by Fraud Type
Mean Cumulative
Misstatement
(in $ millions)

Median Cumulative
Misstatement
(in $ millions)

Misstatement Type

# of Sample
Companies

Asset Misstatements

38

$39.4

$4.9

Revenue or Gain
Misstatements

32

$9.6

$4.4

Net Income
Misstatements

31

$16.5

$2.3

Pre-tax Income
Misstatements

30

$9.2

$5.4

Misappropriations of
Assets

12

$77.5

$2.0

Note: See Table 1 for the typical size o f the companies involved.
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Table 11 - Largest Single Period Income Misstatement

# of Sample
Companies

Mean Largest Single
Year or Quarter
Misstatement
(in $ millions)

Median Largest Single
Year or Quarter
Misstatement
(in $ millions)

Information reported as
a function of pre-tax income

48

$7.1

$3.2

Information reported as a
function of net income

41

$9.9

$2.2

Description

Timing of Fraud Period
For the 204 instances of fraudulent financial report
ing included in our final sample, the related fraudu
lently misstated financial statements were issued in
calendar years beginning in 1980 and extending
through 1997. No clear trend is apparent across the
period of this study.

Typical Length o f Fraud Period
The financial statement frauds generally involved
multiple fiscal periods. Information to determine the
number of months from the beginning of the first fraud
period to the end of the last fraud period was avail
able for 197 of the 204 sample companies. For those
197 companies, the number of months from the be
ginning of the first fraud period to the end of the last
fraud period averaged 23.7 months with a median of
21 months. Most of the fraud periods overlapped a
portion of two fiscal years by either misstating the
annual or quarterly financial statements in at least two
fiscal periods. Many of the frauds began with mis
statements of interim financial statements that were
continued in annual financial statement filings. Only
27 of the 197 companies (14 percent) issued fraudu
lent financial statements involving a period less than
12 months. The longest fraud period extended to six
years (72 months) for one of the sample companies.

Financial statement fraud tends to involve
multiple fiscal periods.

Methods o f Fraudulently Reporting
Financial Statement Information
Based upon information included in the AAERs, we
made our best attempt at identifying the methods used
to fraudulently report the financial statement infor
mation. As noted in Table 12, the two most common
techniques used to fraudulently misstate financial
statement information involved improper revenue rec
ognition techniques to overstate revenues and im
proper techniques to overstate assets. Fifty percent
of the 204 sample companies recorded revenues in
appropriately, primarily by recording revenues pre
maturely or by creating fictitious revenue transactions.
Fifty percent of the 204 sample companies overstated
assets by overvaluing existing assets, recording ficti
tious assets or assets not owned, or capitalizing items
that should have been expensed.6 Eighteen percent
of the 204 companies’ financial statements were mis
stated through the understatement of expenses or li
abilities. Most of the financial statement fraud in
stances involved intentionally misstating financial
statement information, with only 12 percent of the
fraud cases involving misappropriation of company
assets. This is consistent with the finding in the 1987
Report o f the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting that 13 percent of the cases
against public companies involved misappropriations
of assets (p. 112).
6To avoid double-counting, the information about the overstatement o f
assets does not include overstatements o f accounts receivable due to the
revenue recognition frauds.
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Table 12 - Common Financial Statement Fraud Techniques
Percentage of the 204 Sample
Companies Using a Fraud
Method

Methods Used to Misstate Financial Statements
Improper Revenue Recognition:
Recording fictitious revenues - 26%
Recording revenues prematurely - 24%
No description/ “overstated” - 16%

50%

Overstatement of Assets (excluding accounts receivable
overstatements due to revenue fraud): a
Overstating existing assets - 37%
Recording fictitious assets or
assets not owned - 12%
Capitalizing items that
should be expensed - 6%

50%

Understatement of Expenses/Liabilities:

18%

Misappropriation of Assets:

12%

Inappropriate Disclosure (with no financial
statement line-item effects):

8%

Other Miscellaneous Techniques:

20%

a Note: The subcategories such as premature revenues or fictitious revenues and assets do not sum to the category totals due to multiple types
o f fraud employed at a single company.

Fraudulent misstatement of financial statements
frequently involves the overstatement of rev
enues and assets. Intentional misstatement of
financial statements is noted much more fre
quently than misappropriation of assets.

Eight percent of the 204 sample companies issued
statements or press releases with inappropriate dis
closures (without financial statement line-item ef
fects). There were a variety of other miscellaneous
fraud techniques used, including inappropriate ac
counting for acquisition transactions, misstating capi
tal or surplus accounts, forging audit opinions, and
engaging auditors who are not CPAs or public accoun
tants. Because the financial statement frauds at the
sample companies often involved more than one fraud

technique, the sum of the percentages reported ex
ceeds 100 percent.
As noted above, half of the sample companies over
stated revenues. The revenue misstatements were
primarily due to recording revenues prematurely or
fictitiously by employing a variety of techniques that
include the following:
•

Sham sales. To cover the fraud, company
representatives often falsified inventory
records, shipping records, and invoices. In
some cases, the company recorded sales for
goods merely shipped to another company
location. In other cases, the company pre
tended to ship goods to appear as if a sale
occurred and then hid the related inventory

Section III — Detailed Analysis of Instances of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997 25

ucts and recording revenues at full, rather than
discounted, prices.

(which was never shipped to customers) from
company auditors.
Premature revenues before all the terms
of the sale were completed. Generally this
involved recording sales after the goods were
ordered but before they were shipped to the
customer.
Conditional sales. These transactions were
recorded as revenues even though the sales
involved unresolved contingencies or the
terms of the sale were amended subsequently
by side letter agreements that often eliminated
the customer’s obligation to keep the mer
chandise.
Improper cutoff of sales. To increase rev
enues, the accounting records were held open
beyond the balance sheet date to record sales
of the subsequent accounting period in the
current period.
Improper use of the percentage of comple
tion method. Revenues were overstated by
accelerating the estimated percentage of
completion for projects in process.
Unauthorized shipments. Revenues were
overstated by shipping goods never ordered
by the customer or by shipping defective prod

•

Consignment sales. Revenues were recorded
for consignment shipments or shipments of
goods for customers to consider on a trial
basis.

In several instances, the fraud was not detected by
external auditors because company representatives
were able to falsify confirmation responses directly
or indirectly by convincing third parties to alter the
confirmation response.
Half of the sample companies misstated the financial
statement information by overstating assets. Table
13 highlights the typical asset accounts overstated by
sample companies. Even excluding the effects of mis
stating accounts receivable due to the revenue recog
nition frauds, the two most common asset accounts
misstated were inventory and accounts receivable.
Other asset accounts misstated included property,
plant and equipment, loans/notes receivable, cash, in
vestments, patent accounts, and valuations of oil, gas,
and mineral reserves.
Asset misstatements frequently involve;
Understating receivable allowances.
Inflating existing asset values by using
higher market versus cost values.
Recording nonexistent assets.

Table 13 - Asset Accounts Frequently Misstated
Asset Accounts Typically
Overstated
Inventory
Accounts Receivable
(other than revenue fraud)
Property, Plant, & Equipment
Loans/Notes Receivable
Cash
Investments
Patents
Oil, Gas, & Mineral Reserves

# of Sample
Companies Involved
24
21
15
11
7
7
7
7
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Table 14 - Size of Audit Firms Issuing Reports on
Fraudulent Financial Statements

Auditor Type

Number of Sample
Companies with Auditor
Information Available

Percentage of Sample
Companies with Auditor
Information Available

94
73
167

56%
44%

Big Eight/Six Auditor
Non-Big Eight/Six Auditor

Issues Related to the External Auditor
Auditors Associated with Fraud Companies
We reviewed the last set of audited financial state
ments issued during the fraud period to identify the
auditor responsible for issuing an audit opinion on
those fraudulently misstated financial statements. We
were able to obtain the auditor’s report for the last
fraudulently issued financial statements for 141 of the
204 sample fraud companies. In addition to reading
the auditor’s report, we were able to identify the au
ditor associated with the fraud period from informa
tion contained in the AAERs for an additional 26
sample fraud companies. Based on our review of the
auditor’s report for the last set of fraudulent state
ments (supplemented by information contained in re
lated AAERs), we were able to identify the auditor
for 167 of the 204 sample companies.
As reported in Table 14, we found that the Big Eight/
Six audited 56 percent of the sample fraud compa
nies (94 of the 167 companies) in the last year of the
fraud period, with the remaining 44 percent (73 of
the 167 companies) audited by a non-Big Eight/Six
auditor. Based on a supplemental analysis (not re
ported in the tables), there is some evidence that the
Big Eight/Six share of the fraud-related audits dropped
slightly over the time period examined in this study,
which may be reflective of their efforts to retain fewer
risky clients.

100%

We also reviewed the auditor’s opinion on the last set
of financial statements that were fraudulently mis
stated to determine whether the auditor’s report con
tained any modifications or qualifications. For the
141 sample fraud companies where we were able to
review the auditor’s report, we determined that 78 of
those 141 audit reports (55 percent) contained unquali
fied auditor opinions (“clean” opinions). The remain
ing reports (45 percent) departed from the standard
unqualified report for a variety of reasons (in some
cases more than one reason caused the modification).
Nineteen of the 141 audit reports (13 percent) con
tained auditor reports that were modified or qualified
due to going concern issues and eighteen (13 percent)
were modified or qualified due to litigation or other
uncertainties."7 An additional 15 of 141 audit reports
(11 percent) were modified due to a change in ac
counting principle and 20 (14 percent) were modi
fied due to different auditors being involved with cur
rent and prior year financial statements presented com
paratively. Four of the 141 (three percent) audit re
ports were modified due to GAAP departures, and
only four of the 141 (three percent) audit reports in
cluded disclaimers of opinion. See Table 15.

7The form of reporting for uncertainties changed as a result o f the issu
ance of the expectation gap Statements on Auditing Standards in 1988.
Thus, the form o f reporting (modifications versus qualifications) varied
across the years involved.
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Table 15 - Types of Auditor Reports on Last Fraud Financial Statements
Number of
Reports by
Type

Percentage of
Audit Reports by
Type

Unqualified Opinions

78

55%

Modified or Qualified Reports
Going concern - 19 reports
Litigation uncertainties - 9 reports
Other uncertainties - 9 reports
Change in accounting principle - 15 reports
Change in auditor across
comparative reporting periods - 20 reports
GAAP departures - 4 reports

59

42%

4

3%

141

100%

Type of Auditor Report

Note: The above do not sum to equal the 59 modified or qualified
reports because some o f the reports addressed more than one
modification/qualification issue.

Disclaimers of Opinion
Number of Auditor Reports Available for Review

Table 1 6 - Types o f Auditors Named in AAERs

AAERs Name Auditor For
Apparent Involvement (n=30)
Substandard Audit (n=26)
Total Number of AAERs
Naming Auditor

Number of AAERs
Naming Big Eight/Six
Auditors
1
9

Number of AAERs Naming
Non-Big Eight/Six
Auditors
29
11

10

46

Alleged Auditor Involvement in the Fraud
In 29 percent of the cases (56 of 195 cases), the exter
nal auditor was named in an AAER. Out of the 56
cases where the auditor was named, the auditor was
charged in 30 cases with either violating Rule 10(b)5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or charged with
aiding and abetting others in a violation of Rule 10(b)5. Of those 30 cases, 29 involved non-Big Eight/Six
auditors with only one involving a Big Eight/Six au
ditor.

In the remaining 26 of 56 cases where the auditor was
named, the auditor was accused of performing a sub
standard audit. Out of these 26 cases, 17 involved
non-Big Eight/Six auditors and nine involved Big
Eight/Six auditors. See Table 16.
The external auditor was named in an AAER
for 29 percent of the sample companies. Most
of those auditors named were non-Big Eight/
Six auditors.
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Auditor Changes During Fraud Period
We gathered data to be able to compare the name of
the auditor associated with the last fraudulent finan
cial statements to the name of the auditor who issued
an audit report on the last clean financial statements.
We were able to make that comparison for 88 sample
fraud companies. We found that 23 (26 percent) of
the 88 companies changed auditors between the pe
riod that the company issued the last clean financial
statements and the period the company issued the last
set of fraudulent financial statements. Of those switch
ing auditors, one company switched from one Big
Eight/Six firm to another Big Eight/Six firm, four
switched from a Big Eight/Six firm to a non-Big Eight/
Six firm, six switched from a non-Big Eight/Six firm
to a Big Eight/Six firm, and 12 switched between nonBig Eight/Six firms. We also reviewed the timing of
the auditor switch and found that just over half of
those companies changed auditors during the fraud
period (e.g., two audit firms were associated with the
fraud period). Nine companies changed auditors at
the end of the last clean financial statement period
(e.g., just before the fraud period began).

Most auditor switches occurred during the
fraud period (versus before the fraud period)
and most involved changes among non-Big
Eight/Six audit firms.

Consequences for the Company and
Individuals Involved
Consequences for the Company
We attempted to identify consequences for compa
nies that resulted from the commission of the finan
cial statement fraud. First, we noted consequences
described in the AAERs for each of the 204 sample
companies. Then, we performed extensive searches
of electronic databases of business press articles writ
ten during the period from the date of the last fraudu
lent financial statement through two years after the
SEC issued the last AAER related to the fraud. We
were able to locate business press articles appearing

in that time frame for 167 of the 204 sample compa
nies.8
We identified 73 (36 percent) of the 204 sample com
panies that either filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, were
described as “defunct” in the AAER, or were taken
over by a state or federal regulator after the fraud oc
curred. We also found that an additional 31 compa
nies (15 percent) either sold a large portion of their
assets (six companies), merged with another company
(15 companies), or had a new controlling shareholder
(10 companies) following the occurrence of the fi
nancial statement fraud. Thus, approximately 50 per
cent of the companies were no longer in existence or
were under a substantially different form of owner
ship and existence following the fraud period. We
identified 42 companies (21 percent) whose stock was
delisted from the national stock exchange where the
stock was traded. See Table 17.

Thirty-six percent of the sample companies went
bankrupt/defunct or were taken over by a regu
lator. Twenty-one percent were delisted by a
national stock exchange.

8Frequencies of consequences reported in this section are inherently un
derstated given that we were only able to identify consequences explic
itly noted in an AAER or in business press articles. Given that the busi
ness press often does not cover smaller or otherwise less visible compa
nies, there are likely to be many consequences that occurred that we
were unable to identify for our sample firms (which tend to be relatively
small).
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Table 17 - Status of Companies After Fraud Disclosed

Company Status Subsequent to the Fraud

Number of Sample
Companies
Affected

Percentage of
Sample
Companies
Affected

Bankrupt, defunct
Changed ownership
Sold large portion of assets
- Merged with another company
Experienced change in controlling shareholders
Total

73

36%

6
15
10
31

3%
1%
5%
15%

Delisted from national stock exchange

42

21%

Financial and Other Consequences to
Companies and Individuals Involved
In addition to the injunctions and disgorgements fre
quently associated with SEC actions, we also tried to
identify other consequences for companies and indi
viduals. We found 49 companies (24 percent) that
were sued and/or settled with shareholders or bond
holders, generally as a part of class action lawsuits
filed subsequent to the disclosure of the fraud.9 We
identified the amount of fines and settlements paid
by the company for 30 of these 49 companies. The
cumulative amount of fines and settlements paid by

9This finding is lower than the finding o f 58 percent reported in the study
conducted by Bonner, Palmrose, and Young (1998). Our result is likely
understated given it is based on our extensive search of business publica
tions, while the Bonner et al. result is based on analysis o f litigation
databases, which are not necessarily readily available in public sources.
See Section VI for more discussion about the Bonner et al. study.

all sample companies was $348 million. The average
fine or settlement paid by a single company was $12
million, and the median was $4 million. We also iden
tified 35 companies whose senior executives paid fines
related to actions taken by the SEC against them per
sonally. The cumulative amount of fines paid by se
nior executives of those 35 companies totaled $193
million. The average fine paid by senior executives
was $5.5 million, with a median fine of $456,000. To
put these fines and settlements in perspective, the
average cumulative misstatement reported earlier in
Table 9 was $25 million with a median cumulative
misstatement of $4.1 million. See Table 18.
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Table 18 - Fines and Settlements

Number of
Companies
Identified

Cumulative
Fine/Settlement
Paid by All
Companies

Mean Fine/
Settlement
Paid by a
Single
Company

Median Fine/
Settlement
Paid by a
Single
Company

Fines and settlements
paid by the company

30

$348 million

$12 million

$4 million

Fines and settlements
paid by senior executives
related to SEC actions

35

$193 million

$5.5 million

$456,000

Description of
Fine

Table 19 - Other Consequences to Executives and Companies
Number of
Companies
Affected

Percentage of
Companies
Affected

76
47
32

37%
23%
16%

Senior executive(s) barred from service as
officer or director of another SEC
registrant for period of time

54

26%

Company executives criminally prosecuted
for fraud

31

15%

Description of Outcome
Resignations or terminations of
- CEO or president
- CFO or controller
- COO or another senior executive

In addition to direct financial penalties, senior execu
tives were penalized in other ways as highlighted in
Table 19. We identified 76 companies (37 percent)
whose CEO or president was forced to resign or was
terminated as a result of the fraud. We found that 47
companies (23 percent) terminated or forced the CFO
or controller to resign and 32 companies (16 percent)
experienced the termination or resignation of the COO
or another senior executive as a result of the fraud.
Again, the frequencies of resignations and termina
tions are likely understated given the lack of consis
tent reporting of such events in the business press for
all sample companies. Senior executives of 54 com

panies (26 percent) were barred for a period of time,
and in some cases permanently, from serving as an
officer or director of another registrant of the SEC.
Thirty-one companies’ executives (15 percent) were
criminally prosecuted for the financial statement fraud.
We identified 27 senior executives who were jailed
as a result of their involvement in the fraud.
The business press reported stock price declines fol
lowing the public announcement of the fraud for 20
of the sample companies. For those 20 companies,
the stock price dropped an average of 58 percent fol
lowing the public disclosure of the fraud.

Section IV — Implications of the Study 31

SECTION IV
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
One of the objectives of this study is to evaluate the
findings for implications regarding the corporate fi
nancial reporting process. This section highlights
several implications developed by the research team
based on the descriptive analysis of characteristics
associated with the 204 sample fraud companies ex
amined in this study.
Our attempt to draw implications from the findings
in this study is designed to assist others in the identi
fication of potential improvements to the existing fi
nancial reporting system. In doing so, we recognize
that the presence of financial statement fraud is rela
tively infrequent, making the task of fraud detection
extremely difficult. We acknowledge the tremendous
benefit of hindsight evaluation of known cases of fi
nancial statement fraud as we present these implica
tions. Furthermore, some of the implications reflect
our judgments and opinions that developed from the
extensive analysis of the sample cases. In any event,
hopefully the implications noted in this section will
spawn useful consideration of changes that can pro
mote higher quality financial reporting.

Implications Related to the Nature of
Companies Involved
Strained Resources of Smaller Companies
Pinch Internal Controls
Because fraud companies were relatively small (gen
erally less than $100 million in assets) when com
pared to many publicly traded companies in the U.S.,
many of these companies may be unable or unwilling
to implement effective internal controls, particularly
adequate segregation of key duties. The lack of ideal
internal control may create opportunities for senior
management to override existing controls. In addi
tion, smaller companies may be unable or even un
willing to employ executives with expertise in finan
cial reporting processes, particularly those individu
als knowledgeable of the legal requirements for pub

licly traded companies. Thus, boards of directors,
audit committees, and external and internal auditors
may need to closely examine the effects of these types
of resource constraints on the likelihood of financial
statement improprieties for the entities they serve.

Some companies may not be able to cost ef
fectively justify effective internal controls due
to their size. Other companies may be unwill
ing to invest necessary resources to imple
ment strong controls.

Small Size of Fraud Companies Has
Implications for Regulators and Exchanges
In certain cases, companies below a certain size thresh
old are exempted from many of the listing require
ments of the national stock exchanges and other regu
lations, for valid reasons (primarily cost concerns).
As an example, many of the recommendations con
tained in the Report and Recommendations o f the Blue
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness o f
Corporate Audit Committees (BRC, 1999) explicitly
exempt smaller companies (e.g., market capitalization
of $200 million or below). As a result, certain regu
latory provisions may fail to target companies with
an increased likelihood for financial statement fraud.
The national stock exchanges and regulators should
carefully evaluate the trade-offs of designing policies
that occasionally exempt small companies.

Certain regulatory provisions may exempt
companies with an increased likelihood for
financial statement fraud.
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Going Concern Needs Close Monitoring
Pressures for survival and pressures to meet earnings
expectations can create obvious strains on senior ex
ecutives. Given that many of the sample fraud com
panies were in a net loss position or were on the brink
of a net loss position in periods leading up to the fraud
period, boards of directors, audit committees, and both
internal and external auditors may want to develop
systems or procedures for regularly monitoring these
financial pressures, particularly as financial health
appears to be deteriorating.
The presence of financial distress for some compa
nies in periods before the alleged fraud period high
lights the importance of effective monitoring of go
ing concern. Given observations of auditor changes
during the fraud period, close screening of going con
cern indicators and effective communications with
predecessor auditors when evaluating potentially new
clients are particularly important.

The financial stress of many fraud companies
highlights the importance of effective moni
toring of going concern.

Implications Related to the Nature of
the Control Environment (Top Manage
ment and the Board)
Thorough Assessments of Top Management
Pressures and Integrity Warranted
The overwhelming percentage of senior executives
named in the AAERs highlights the importance of a
detailed and continuous analysis of issues affecting
the organization’s control environment (e.g., the “tone
at the top”), as emphasized in COSO’s Internal Con
trol - Integrated Framework (COSO, 1992). The fre
quency of CEO and CFO involvement highlights the
importance of assessing key performance pressures
faced by senior executives. Boards of directors and
audit committees need to consider the potential for
these pressures when designing executive compensa
tion plans for their key executives. Board of director

and audit committee members need to exercise pro
fessional skepticism when evaluating top management
actions. Boards and audit committees may also look
for pressures from outside the organization for meet
ing key company performance targets. Monitoring
perceived pressures from the investment community
to meet stated performance expectations, for example,
may be warranted for boards, audit committees, and
auditors.

Boards of directors, audit committee mem
bers, and auditors need to consider the po
tential for pressures on management result
ing from compensation plans and expecta
tions from the investment community.

The involvement of senior executives, such as the
CEO, CFO, and COO, highlights the importance of
effective monitoring by boards and audit committees
of opportunities and incentives for management over
ride of existing policies and procedures. Not only
does financial statement fraud occur because of the
presence of opportunities for override, but fraud also
exists because there are managers who are willing to
manipulate information inappropriately. The fact that
misstatements are generated by executives willing to
act inappropriately highlights the importance of ef
fective screening of the integrity and reputations of
potential executives.
Auditors also benefit from extensive consideration of
the integrity and attitudes toward financial reporting
of senior executives, particularly as auditors evaluate
risks associated with a potential new client. Effec
tive pre-engagement screening of potential risks, par
ticularly the impact of management’s integrity and
ethical values, may lead to better considerations of
overall audit risk, particularly the risk of financial
statement fraud. Routine performance of private in
vestigations of the potential new client’s management
team may warrant special consideration by auditors
to help them obtain an evaluation of these engage
ment factors.
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Employment decisions and client acceptance
procedures may need to involve explicit con
sideration of the integrity and ethical reputa
tions of senior executives.

The frequency of non-accountant executives’ (e.g.,
CEOs and COOs) involvement in financial statement
fraud may be in part due to a lack of understanding of
the severity of the consequences of violating finan
cial reporting requirements, particularly legal statutes
applicable to financial reporting matters for publicly
traded companies. Their involvement highlights the
importance of effective education of CEOs and COOs
in basic financial reporting requirements. Their in
volvement also highlights the need for the participa
tion of other qualified individuals in financial report
ing processes. The involvement of individuals with
financial reporting expertise, such as controllers, gen
eral counsels, internal and external auditors, may help
to educate non-accountant executives who are less
familiar with the requirements of financial reporting
in publicly traded companies. The involvement of
knowledgeable individuals may also help restrain se
nior executives who continue to be overly aggressive
in financial reporting matters. Board members and
auditors should also be alert for managers who use
their knowledge of financial reporting matters to cover
a fraud.

Involvement of individuals knowledgeable of
financial reporting issues can help educate
other less knowledgeable senior executives
about risks associated with financial report
ing.

mit fraud. In the absence of an effective audit com
mittee, typical audit committee functions such as fi
nancial oversight, risk analysis, and assessment of
management integrity may suffer.
The concentration of fraud among companies with
under $50 million in revenues and with generally weak
audit committees highlights the importance of ques
tioning whether more rigorous audit committee prac
tices should be followed by smaller organizations. In
particular, the number of audit committee meetings
per year and the financial expertise of audit commit
tee members may deserve closer attention. Audit com
mittees meeting less than twice per year or those com
posed of non-experts may have no reasonable chance
of functioning effectively.
The audit committee’s effectiveness also is restricted
by the quality and extent of information it receives.
To perform effective monitoring, the audit commit
tee needs access to reliable financial and nonfinan
cial information, industry and other external
benchmarking data, and other comparative informa
tion that is prepared on a consistent basis. Boards
and audit committees should work to obtain from se
nior management and other information providers rel
evant and reliable data to assist them in the financial
reporting monitoring process.

Board Independence and Expertise are
Important for Companies of all Sizes

Audit Committee Diligence is Critical for
Companies of All Sizes

The proxy analysis suggested that the fraud compa
nies’ boards generally were neither independent
(dominated by insiders and gray directors) nor expert
(little if any board experience elsewhere). A board’s
effective monitoring of management relies on inde
pendent experts devoting sufficient time and energy
to their task. If the directors are neither independent
nor expert, the board may have no reasonable chance
of functioning as a vigorous monitor of management.

The analysis of proxy data indicated that most of the
fraud companies either had no audit committee or had
one that met less than twice per year. In such an envi
ronment, the external auditors may have had little
support or oversight from the board, and company
executives may have been in a better position to com

While the small size of many of the fraud companies
likely accounts for the apparent lack of director inde
pendence and expertise, it is important to consider
whether smaller organizations should focus more
heavily on director independence and expertise. In
the smaller company setting, due to the centralization
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of power in a few individuals, it may be especially
important to have a solid monitoring function per
formed by the board.
Relationships and Personal Factors May
Increase Risk
The proxy analysis provided evidence of various re
lationships and personal factors that may indicate
greater risk. Investors should be aware of the pos
sible complications arising from family relationships
and from individuals (founders, CEO/board chairs,
etc.) who hold significant power or incompatible job
functions. Due to the size and nature of the sample
companies, the existence of such relationships and
personal factors is to be expected. It is important to
recognize that such conditions present both benefits
and costs.

Implications Related to Nature of
Frauds
Close Scrutiny Over Interim Financial
Reporting
From our readings of the AAERs, we observed that
many frauds allegedly were initiated in a quarterly
Form 10-Q, with the first manipulation sometimes at
relatively small amounts. After observing that the
fraud was undetected in initial attempts, the fraud
scheme was repeated in subsequently issued quarterly
or annual financial statements, with the fraud amount
often increasing over time and generally stretching
over two fiscal years.
These observations highlight the importance of ac
tive review of quarterly financial statements by audit
committees and external auditors. Close scrutiny of
quarterly financial information and a move toward
continuous auditing strategies may increase opportu
nities for earlier detection of financial statement im
proprieties.
These observations also have implications for man
agement and internal auditors who may want to ex
amine existing processes and controls surrounding the
preparation of interim financial statements. In par

ticular, the presence of some financial statement frauds
involving strictly interim periods suggests that pro
cesses and controls related to interim reporting may
be unduly less rigorous than those controls surround
ing annual financial reporting.

Policies and procedures surrounding prepa
ration of interim financial statements may
need to be examined.

Procedures Needed for Revenue Recognition
and Asset Valuation
The frequency of recording sales prematurely or fic
titiously suggests the importance of both external and
internal auditor consideration of existing company
processes and controls designed to ensure compliance
with revenue recognition principles. The recording
of sales before customer order or customer shipment
suggests a particular need for close examination by
managers and auditors of evidence documenting sat
isfaction of transaction terms, particularly for trans
actions near period end. Focusing on the control en
vironment, particularly an assessment of the likeli
hood of management override, may provide useful
insights as to the possibility for inappropriate account
ing for revenue transactions.
In addition to focusing on processes and controls re
lated to recording sales transactions, the misstatements
due to improper cutoffs of sales transactions, over
stated percentage of completion estimates, and sub
sequent modifications to terms of sales through side
agreements all highlight the benefits of properly ex
ecuted tests of controls and substantive procedures
that focus closely on end-of-the-period transactions.
Procedures designed to evaluate transaction cutoff and
to examine estimates generated by management may
have an impact on identifying potential misstatements
surrounding revenue recognition issues. Also, test
ing to identify the presence of side agreements that
modify transaction terms may need to be addressed
with customers directly through confirmation proce
dures. However, there were instances where confir
mation recipients were participants in the fraud. Thus,
sending confirmations may not always reduce audit
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risk to a desirable level. When the risk of potential
fraud is assessed as high, auditors may want to con
sider delaying the completion of the audit until suffi
cient cash receipts have been received for the trans
actions in question.
Misstatements due to asset overstatements also high
light the importance of effective procedures surround
ing valuation of asset accounts. Many of the asset
overstatements involved manipulation of sensitive
estimates of allowances for doubtful receivables and
valuations of unusual assets such as patents, mineral
reserves, and unique inventory and property, plant,
and equipment items. Obtaining evidence to sub
stantiate key judgments made by company managers
in the valuation process may identify overly aggres
sive and improper valuation techniques employed. In
addition, the identification of misstatements due to
the recording of fictitious assets highlights the im
portance of substantive testing techniques, particu
larly physical examination, to ensure compliance with
the existence assertion.

Findings suggest a continued need for evalu
ating and testing controls related to record
ing key end-of-period accounts and transac
tions and the importance of the design and
performance of effective substantive proce
dures in light of the knowledge obtained about
internal controls.

Implications Regarding the Roles of
External Auditors
The collective implications about the nature of the
companies involved, the role of the control environ
ment, and specific characteristics of the fraud sug
gest the need for the auditor to look beyond the finan
cial statements to understand risks unique to the
client’s industry, management’s motivation toward
aggressive reporting, and client internal control,
among other matters. In particular, auditors may ben
efit greatly by focusing closely on the control envi
ronment, starting with the board and audit committee
and including an extensive assessment of the integ
rity and financial reporting knowledge and ability of

senior management. Auditors should recognize the
potential for greater audit risk when auditing compa
nies with weak board and audit committee governance.
As auditors approach the audit, information from a
variety of sources should be considered to establish
an appropriate level of professional skepticism needed
for each engagement.

Auditors need to look beyond the financial
statements to understand risks associated with
the client’s industry, management’s financial
reporting incentives, and internal control, with
particular emphasis on the strength of board
and audit committee governance.

The next section titled, “The Focus on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting,” is provided for those interested
in gaining a perspective on the significant efforts since
the issuance of the Treadway Commission’s 1987 re
port by various organizations to address financial re
porting problems. Numerous significant changes have
been implemented throughout the 1990s affecting
various parties in the financial reporting process.
Section V summarizes these actions. In addition to
these efforts, academic research has been conducted
to better understand issues affecting fraudulent finan
cial reporting instances. Section VI titled, “Overview
of Findings from Academic Research,” contains a
summary of findings from research that provides ad
ditional insights to those interested in improving cor
porate financial statement reporting.
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SECTION V
THE FOCUS ON FRAUDULENT
FINANCIAL REPORTING
In October 1987, the National Commission on Fraudu
lent Financial Reporting issued a landmark report
titled, Report o f the National Commission on Fraudu
lent Financial Reporting, in response to a major ef
fort to highlight concerns about fraudulent financial
reporting (NCFFR, 1987). It had a major impact in
refocusing the business community on the problem
of fraudulent financial reporting and provided a sig
nificant update as to the problem of fraudulent finan
cial reporting throughout much of the 1980s. Earlier
efforts such as The Commission on Auditor’s Respon
sibilities: Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations
(commonly referred to as the Cohen Commission
Report) issued in 1978 previously highlighted the
growing gap between auditor performance and finan
cial statement user expectations. In particular, the
Cohen Commission’s Report primarily targeted the
development of conclusions and recommendations
regarding the appropriate responsibilities of indepen
dent auditors, including the auditor’s responsibility
for the detection of fraudulent financial reporting
(AICPA Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities,
1978).
While not only serving as an update to earlier reports
such as the Cohen Commission’s Report, the
Treadway Commission’s study of incidents of finan
cial statement fraud focused on a broader range of
parties playing a vital role in the financial reporting
process. Given that consequences of fraud, while in
frequent, can be widespread, the report expanded be
yond a focus on auditor responsibilities and included
49 extensive recommendations that embraced the roles
of top management and boards of directors of public
companies, independent public accountants and the
public accounting profession, the SEC and other regu
latory and law enforcement bodies, and the academic
community. The Treadway Commission’s report de
veloped many of its recommendations based on the
Commission’s identification of numerous causal fac

tors that can lead to financial statement fraud, which
are described in the Treadway Commission’s report.

Throughout the 1990s there have been numer
ous efforts designed to improve the effective
ness of auditors, managers, boards of direc
tors, and audit committees in preventing fi
nancial statement fraud.

In the decade following the issuance of the Report of
the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting, there have been numerous efforts build
ing upon the Treadway Commission’s findings de
signed to minimize incidents of fraudulent financial
reporting. These efforts have particularly focused on
the roles auditors, managers, boards of directors, and
audit committees play in the financial reporting pro
cess.

Efforts Related to the Role of Auditors
The independent auditor of financial statements plays
a vital role in the detection of (material) fraudulent
financial reporting. The investing public and credi
tors look to the independent audit process to gain as
surance and confidence in the reliability of financial
statements they rely upon to make significant busi
ness decisions. Numerous efforts have been made by
the auditing profession to improve its performance in
the detection of material misstatements in financial
statements due to fraud. Several of those efforts have
originated since the issuance of the Treadway
Commission’s 1987 report.
SAS No. 53. Soon after the issuance of the Treadway
Commission’s report, the AICPA’s Auditing Standards
Board (ASB) issued Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and
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Report Errors and Irregularities (AICPA, 1988). The
ASB issued SAS No. 53 to strengthen the auditor’s
responsibility related to the detection of instances of
material fraudulent financial reporting. SAS No. 53
modified the auditor’s responsibility to require the
auditor to “design the audit to provide reasonable as
surance of detecting errors and irregularities.” SAS
No. 53 was designed to narrow the expectation gap
between the assurances auditors provide and what fi
nancial statement users expect regarding the detec
tion of fraudulent financial reporting. SAS No. 53
required the auditor to provide reasonable assurance
that material irregularities would be detected, which
extended the auditor’s responsibility beyond what was
required by SAS No. 53’s predecessor — SAS No.
16, The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the
Detection of Errors and Irregularities.
Public Oversight Board’s 1993 Special Report.
Subsequent to the issuance of SAS No. 53, the Public
Oversight Board of the AICPA SEC Practice Section
(the POB) issued in March 1993 a Special Report
titled, In the Public Interest: Issues Confronting the
Accounting Profession (AICPA POB, 1993). That
report was primarily in response to continuing signs
of failing public confidence in public accountants and
auditors, particularly the widespread belief that audi
tors have a responsibility for detecting management
fraud which many viewed auditors as not meeting.
Based on the POB’s belief that the integrity and reli
ability of audited financial statements are critical to
the U.S. economy, the POB’s Special Report con
tained, among others, specific recommendations for
improving and strengthening the accounting
profession’s performance by enhancing its capacity
and willingness to detect fraud and improve the fi
nancial reporting process. The POB’s Special Report
called for improved guidance beyond that in SAS No.
53 to assist auditors in assessing the likelihood of
fraud, a strengthening of the process to ensure audi
tor independence and professionalism, and changes
in the corporate governance process. The POB made
several recommendations directed at putting in place
mechanisms to analyze audit failures in order to fer
ret out their causes, the symptoms related to those
causes, and the actions that might be taken to avoid
their recurrence. The POB was especially interested

in enhancing the auditing profession’s potential for
detecting management fraud.
AICPA Board of Directors’ 1993 Report. Also in
1993, the AICPA’s Board of Directors issued its re
port, Meeting the Financial Reporting Needs o f the
Future: A Public Commitment from the Public Ac
counting Profession (AICPA Board of Directors,
1993). In that report, the AICPA Board of Directors
expressed its determination to keep the United States’
financial reporting system the best in the world, sup
ported the recommendations and initiatives of others
to assist auditors in the detection of material misstate
ments in financial statements resulting from fraud, and
encouraged every participant in the financial report
ing process — management, their advisors, regula
tors, and independent auditors — to share in this re
sponsibility.

“Decisive action is needed to bolster the pub
lic trust by strengthening thefinancial report
ing system to meet the needs o f the future. ”
—
Jake Netterville,
AICPA Chairman, June 8, 1993

AICPA SEC Practice Section Initiatives. Soon af
ter the issuance of the POB’s Special Report and the
AICPA’s Board of Directors’ report, the AICPA un
dertook efforts related to improving the financial re
porting process particularly through improved detec
tion of fraudulent financial reporting. The AICPA’s
SEC Practice Section formed a Professional Issues
Task Force that has since its creation published guid
ance about emerging or unresolved practice issues that
surface through litigation analysis, peer review, or in
ternal inspection. The SEC Practice Section also
amended membership requirements to require that
concurring partners provide assurance that those con
sulted on accounting and auditing matters are aware
of all relevant facts and circumstances related to the
consultation issue and to the auditee, to ensure that
the conclusion reached is an appropriate one. Addi
tionally, the AICPA SEC Practice Section created the
Detection and Prevention of Fraud Task Force. That
task force issued a document in 1994 titled. Client
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Acceptance and Continuance Procedures for Audit
Clients. That document emphasized that understand
ing the components of engagement risk is critical to
deciding whether to accept new clients, continue old
ones, and in any event to manage the “audit risk” that
accompanies those decisions. Related to these issues,
the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board ultimately is
sued in 1997 revised professional standards to pro
vide guidance designed to improve understandings
between client management and auditors (SAS No.
83, Establishing an Understanding With the Client,
AICPA 1997b) and to improve communications be
tween successor and predecessor auditors (SAS No.
84, Communications Between Predecessor and Suc
cessor Auditors, AICPA 1997c).
New Fraud Standard: SAS No. 82. With regard to
auditing professional standards specifically related to
the auditor’s detection of material misstatements due
to fraudulent financial reporting, the POB’s 1993 Spe
cial Report highlighted that “Attacks on the account
ing profession from a variety of sources suggested a
significant public concern with the profession’s per
formance. Of particular moment is the widespread
belief that auditors have a responsibility for detecting
management fraud which they are not now meeting”
(AICPA POB, 1993, p. 1). That report called for the
development of guidelines to assist auditors in assess
ing the likelihood of financial statement fraud and to
specify additional auditing procedures when there is
a heightened likelihood of management fraud. Even
before the POB’s Special Report recommendation for
improved auditor guidance was issued, the AICPA had
already convened a conference in 1992 of educators
and practitioners, known as the Expectation Gap
Roundtable, that also raised questions concerning
whether SAS No. 53 had been successful in narrow
ing the expectation gap relating to the detection of
material misstatements in financial statements result
ing from fraud (AICPA, 1993).
Thus, in 1997 the AICPA responded to these calls for
improved auditing guidance related to the detection
of material misstatements due to fraudulent financial
reporting by issuing SAS No. 82, Consideration o f
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 1997a).
SAS No. 82 superseded guidance in SAS No. 53 in
an effort to enhance auditor performance. The

auditor’s responsibility to plan and perform the audit
to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the fi
nancial statements are free of material misstatement,
whether due to error or fraud, did not change from
the SAS No. 53 detection responsibility. However,
SAS No. 82 clarified the auditor’s responsibility to
detect material misstatements resulting from fraudu
lent financial reporting, changed the auditor’s risk
assessment process to require documentation of the
auditor’s assessment of the likelihood of financial
statement fraud, and provided expanded operational
guidance to assist auditors in meeting their already
existing responsibility for the detection of material
misstatements due to fraud.
In particular, SAS No. 82 significantly expanded the
identification of risk factors known to be commonly
linked to instances of fraudulent financial reporting.
The ASB expanded the identification of risk factors
beyond those in SAS No. 53 based on its belief that
the most effective method to assess the risk of mate
rial misstatement due to fraud is to consider whether
risk factors that might indicate the existence of fraud
are present. SAS No. 82 expanded guidance designed
to assist the auditor in developing the appropriate re
sponse to the presence of such risk factors. In addi
tion to providing expanded operational guidance to
assist auditors in the assessment of the potential for
fraudulent financial reporting, SAS No. 82 also re
vised the authoritative literature relating to the con
cepts of due professional care, professional skepti
cism, and obtaining reasonable assurance.
ASB’s Call for Research. While it is the ASB’s hope
that SAS No. 82 leads to improved detection of mate
rial misstatements due to fraud, the AICPA is com
mitted to evaluating how well SAS No. 82 is meeting
the ASB’s objectives. This commitment was estab
lished in the exposure draft of SAS No. 82 whereby
the ASB noted that it will “develop a process to ob
tain feedback on the new standard periodically to as
sess how well it is accomplishing its objectives and
to identify further steps that need to be taken. This
feedback process should be helpful in defining fur
ther research on fraud deterrence and detection.”
Accordingly, in October 1998 the AICPA issued a
Request for Research Proposals for an Assessment of
SAS No. 82 (AICPA, 1998). The ASB is currently
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seeking research relevant to two broad objectives. The
first objective is to provide research to assist the ASB
in its assessment of the effectiveness of SAS No. 82.
The second objective is to provide research to assist
the ASB in its efforts to continually improve SAS No.
82 related guidance by addressing how emerging busi
ness and technology trends affect the process of de
tecting material misstatements due to fraud.

The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) is com
mitted to developing a process to obtain feed
back on the new standard periodically to as
sess how well it is accomplishing its objec
tives and to identify further steps that need to
be taken.
- ASB’s Request for Proposal,
October 1998

This report. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 19871997, contains findings that should provide timely and
relevant information to assist the ASB in this effort.
Specifically, the ASB is interested in gathering infor
mation to assist them in evaluating how complete and
discriminating are the fraud risk factors in SAS No.
82. This study, which contains an extensive descrip
tion of instances of fraudulent financial reporting ad
dressed by AAERs issued during 1987-1997, should
be useful to the ASB in evaluating SAS No. 82.
In addition to these changes in professional standards,
other efforts have occurred that relate to auditors. For
example, in 1988 the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners was established. This professional orga
nization is dedicated to educating qualified individu
als who are trained in the aspects of detecting, inves
tigating, and deterring fraud and white-collar crime.

Efforts Related to the Roles of Management,
Boards of Directors, and Audit Committees
While auditors play a vital role in the detection of
instances of material fraudulent financial reporting,
the Treadway Commission’s 1987 report noted that
the prevention and early detection of fraudulent fi
nancial reporting must start with the entity that pre
pares the financial statements. Every fraudulent fi

nancial statement for which the auditor has been held
responsible was prepared by executives who were
intentionally misstating financial information to de
ceive not only shareholders, investors, and creditors,
but the auditor as well. Thus, the Treadway
Commission’s report contained numerous recommen
dations for public companies, particularly addressing
responsibilities of top management, the board of di
rectors, and the audit committee. In particular, the
Treadway Commission’s report called for all public
companies to maintain internal controls that provide
reasonable assurance that fraudulent financial report
ing will be prevented or subject to early detection.
To assist senior management and others, the Treadway
Commission specifically called for the development
of additional, integrated guidance on internal controls.
COSO’s 1992 Report. In 1992, COSO issued Inter
nal Control - Integrated Framework (hereinafter re
ferred to as the COSO Report) in response to calls for
better internal control systems to help senior execu
tives better control the enterprises they run (COSO,
1992). In addition to noting that internal control can
help an entity achieve its performance and profitabil
ity targets and prevent the loss of resources, the COSO
Report also noted that internal control can significantly
help an entity ensure reliable financial reporting. The
COSO Report:
•

Provided a high-level overview of the inter
nal control framework directed to the chief
executive and other senior officers, board
members, legislators, and regulators,

•

Defined internal control, described its com
ponents and provided criteria against which
managements, boards of directors, and oth
ers can assess their internal control systems.

•

Provided guidance to those entities that re
port publicly on internal control over the
preparation of their published statements, and

•

Contained materials that might be useful in
conducting an evaluation of internal controls.

The issuance of the COSO Report provided a com
mon framework for designing and implementing in
ternal controls and is becoming widely accepted as
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the benchmark for evaluating internal controls for
businesses and other entities — in the public or pri
vate sector, large or small, for profit or not. It is
COSO’s hope that effective implementations by se
nior executives of such a framework would lead to
improved financial reporting in the U.S., including a
reduction in the incidence of fraudulent financial re
porting.
Ultimately, however, the responsibility for establish
ing an effective system of internal control rests with
the board of directors. Shareholders delegate primary
responsibility for the integrity of management and the
financial statement reporting process to boards of di
rectors. The COSO Report noted that a strong and
active board, particularly when coupled with effec
tive upward communications channels and capable
financial, legal, and internal audit functions, is often
best able to identify and correct internal control weak
nesses that enable a dishonest management to inten
tionally misrepresent financial results and cover its
tracks.
Audit Committee Requirements of Major U.S.
Stock Exchanges. Often the board assigns responsi
bility for oversight of the financial reporting process
to an audit committee. In the U.S., all three major
securities markets — the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation System (NASDAQ) — have requirements
addressing audit committee composition. The NYSE
requires (and the AMEX recommends) that listed
companies have audit committees made up entirely
of outside directors. NASDAQ only requires that a
majority of the audit committee consist of outside
directors for companies trading on the National and
Small Cap Markets. These audit committee require
ments were generally in place by the time the
Treadway Commission’s report was issued.1 How
ever, other regulatory actions were undertaken in the
1990s related to the corporate governance process.
For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora
tion implemented new audit committee composition
requirements mandating the inclusion of independent

1The audit committee requirements for the NASDAQ Small Cap Market
did not become effective until 1997.

directors who, for certain large depository institutions,
must include individuals with banking experience.
The Institute of Internal Auditors’ Study on Au
dit Committee Effectiveness. Several highly publi
cized financial reporting frauds have led to questions
regarding how effectively boards and audit commit
tees oversee the financial reporting process. For ex
ample, the New York Times reported that following
an occurrence of material fraudulent financial report
ing, the Leslie Fay Company announced the election
of two additional outside members “to give its board
a more independent character” (New York Times, April
30, 1993). As a result, throughout the 1990s there
have been numerous calls for strengthening the ef
fectiveness of the corporate governance function per
formed by boards of directors and audit committees.
To gain insight into the roles of audit committees in
the corporate governance process. The Institute of
Internal Auditors Research Foundation (IIA RF) is
sued a 1993 report, Improving Audit Committee Per
formance: What Works Best, that summarized a study
conducted by Price Waterhouse on behalf of The IIA
to determine current practices of audit committees and
to gain insight as to how audit committees are likely
to evolve (IIA RF, 1993). The purpose of The IIA
report was to identify organizational and operational
characteristics that not only describe how audit com
mittees function, but how they function effectively.
That report noted that the single most important find
ing and the key to audit committee effectiveness is
that audit committee members must be provided with
more background information and training to enable
them to be more effective. The report noted that au
dit committee members can be effective only if they
thoroughly understand their responsibilities and how
to meet them effectively.
“Audit committee members must be provided
with more background and training to enable
them to be more effective. ”
—
Improving Audit Committee
Performance: What Works Best,
By Price Waterhouse, commissioned by
The Institute of Internal Auditors
Research Foundation
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Public Oversight Board’s Advisory Panel Report.
Following the issuance of The IIA’s report, an Advi
sory Panel on Auditor Independence provided a re
port in 1994 to the FOB titled, Strengthening the Pro
fessionalism of the Independent Auditor (AICPA POB,
1994b). The Advisory Panel’s report highlighted that
“over the past decade the dominance of the process
of corporate governance by management [emphasis
added] has ebbed as boards of directors have assumed
the long-acknowledged but seldom-practiced role as
the ‘fulcrum of accountability’ in the corporate gov
ernance system” (AICPA POB, 1994b, p. 12). The
Advisory Panel’s 1994 report summarized the view
of many corporate governance experts that corporate
governance in the U.S. is not functioning as designed
primarily because too many boards of directors fail
to make the system work the way it should. Lack of
time, unwieldy board size, complexity of information,
and lack of cohesiveness dilute boards’ effectiveness.
As a result of these views, the Advisory Panel en
couraged boards of directors to play an active role in
the financial reporting process and for the auditing
profession to look to the board of directors — the
shareholders’ representative — as its client. The
Advisory Panel urged the POB and the SEC and oth
ers to encourage adoption of proposals such as in
creasing the representation of outsiders on the board
and reducing board size to strengthen the indepen
dence of boards of directors and their accountability
to shareholders. These recommendations were based
on the Advisory Panel’s belief that stronger, more
accountable boards will strengthen the professional
ism of the outside auditor, enhance the value of the
independent audit, and serve the investing public.
In addition to strengthening the role of the board of
directors in the oversight of management, the Advi
sory Panel recommended that audit committees should
expect auditors to be more forthcoming in communi
cating first with the audit committee and then with
the full board to provide the auditor’s perspective of
the company’s operations as well as the company’s
financial reporting policies and practices. The Advi
sory Panel noted that audit committees should expect
to receive, and independent auditors should deliver
forthright, candid, oral reports in a timely manner on
the quality and not just the acceptability of a

company’s financial reporting. It was the Advisory
Panel’s objective to give directors a better basis for
understanding and influencing corporate practices,
which in turn should create a supportive climate lead
ing toward more credible financial reporting.
Public Oversight Board’s 1995 Report. The POB
stated in their 1995 publication, Directors, Manage
ment, and Auditors: Allies in Protecting Shareholder
Interests, that practices followed by well governed
corporations should foster an environment where the
independent auditor, management, audit committee
and board of directors play interactive and timely roles
in the financial reporting process (AICPA POB, 1995).
Having top management and the external auditor in
volved in extensive discussions of important finan
cial reporting matters with the audit committee and
in some cases the full board should enhance the cor
porate governance process and ultimately increase the
credibility of financial reporting in the U.S.
The Independence Standards Board. To help
strengthen the role of the auditor as an independent
assurer of credible financial information and a major
source of information for the audit committee and
board, the accounting profession and the SEC agreed
in 1997 to establish a new private sector body — the
Independence Standards Board (ISB) — to set inde
pendence rules and guidance for auditors of public
companies. Part of the motivation for creating the
ISB was initially based on comments in January 1994
by then SEC Chief Accountant Walter P. Schuetze
where he expressed concern that “.. .auditors [are] not
standing up to their clients on financial accounting
and reporting issues when their clients take a position
that is, at best, not supported in the accounting litera
ture or, at worst, directly contrary to existing pro
nouncements” (as quoted in AICPA POB, 1994a).
Based on the significance of his comments and the
importance of auditor independence as a cornerstone
of the auditing profession, efforts were taken to
strengthen auditor independence as a means designed
to strengthen the overall financial reporting process.
Despite these numerous efforts to improve the corpo
rate governance process, the roles of corporate boards
and audit committees continue to be criticized. For
example, a recent article in The Wall Street Journal
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stated that “Too many audit committees are turning
out to be toothless tigers. This corporate board com
mittee supposedly reviews management’s financial
actions and controls, as well as keeps tabs on internal
and outside auditors. But a flurry of accounting
scandals...indicates that the audit panels in many
cases aren’t doing their jobs” (Lublin and MacDonald,
1998).

'‘Too many audit committees are turning out
to be toothless tigers. ”
— The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1998

Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effec
tiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. In Feb
ruary 1999, the Report and Recommendations o f the
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effective
ness of Audit Committees (BRC, 1999) was issued
containing 10 recommendations designed to improve
the effectiveness of audit committees. The report, pre
pared on behalf of the New York Stock Exchange and
the National Association of Securities Dealers, con
tains recommendations aimed at strengthening the
independence of the audit committee and improving
audit committee effectiveness by encouraging the in
clusion of individuals who are financially literate, the
development of formal written audit committee char
ters, and public reporting by the audit committee. In
addition, the recommendations also address mecha
nisms for accountability among the audit committee,
the outside auditors, and management.

Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit Committees.
In addition, the National Association of Corporate
Directors’ Blue Ribbon Commission on Audit Com
mittees is addressing audit committee effectiveness
by taking a broad approach to identifying a number
of issues that represent “best practices,” with a par
ticular focus on audit committees of smaller compa
nies. It anticipates releasing its report later in 1999.
Part of the scope of the study underlying this report
titled, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997,
involved examining key characteristics associated
with boards of directors, audit committees, and audi
tors for the companies investigated by the SEC dur
ing 1987-1997 for fraudulent financial reporting- This
report contains summaries of many of those charac
teristics in an effort to shed additional light on corpo
rate governance factors that may affect the likelihood
of fraudulent financial reporting.
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SECTION VI
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS FROM
ACADEMIC RESEARCH
The academic community has been actively involved
in conducting empirical research on the problem of
fraudulent financial reporting during the period 19871998. Much of the motivation for such research can
be attributed to the visibility of the problem gener
ated by the release of the 1987 Treadway Commis
sion Report, the issuance of SAS Nos. 53 and 82, and
all the noted calls for improved fraud detection and
prevention. While research on financial statement
fraud existed prior to the late 1980s, that stream of
research was in the early stages of development. This
section highlights the results related to several of those
research efforts.1

Fraud Risk Assessment Model. In response to that
concern, a conceptual model was proposed by
Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) that described the
probability of material misstatement due to fraud as a
function of three factors; (1) the degree to which
conditions are such that a material management fraud
could be committed, (2) the degree to which the per
son or persons of authority and responsibility in the
entity have a reason or motivation to commit man
agement fraud, and (3) the degree to which persons in
positions of authority and responsibility in the entity
have an attitude or set of ethical values such that they
would allow themselves to commit management fraud.

Descriptive Research About Fraud. Much of the
research in the 1980s was primarily descriptive. That
research focused heavily on identifying financial state
ment and nonfinancial characteristics of companies
experiencing fraud (see for example, Elliott and
Willingham, 1980; Albrecht et al., 1982; Merchant,
1987).2 That research provided some of the basis for
many of the fraud risk indicators included in SAS No.
53.

This conceptual model was first validated by
Loebbecke et al. (1989). They surveyed partners in a
Big Eight audit firm about characteristics surround
ing audit engagements where material irregularities
were found to be present. They found that fraud risk
factors consistent with the conceptual fraud assess
ment model were present in a large portion of the cases
involving material irregularities. One of their primary
conclusions was that the fraud assessment model in
corporated a reasoning process, rather than a check
list approach. They were also one of the first to call
for auditors to make separate assessments of the like
lihood of financial statement fraud and the likelihood
of material misstatements due to error.

One of the limitations of prior research regarding fraud
risk factors was the lack of a solid conceptual model
describing the link between fraud risk factors and the
likelihood of financial statement fraud. In addition,
SAS No. 53 presented 21 factors that may contribute
to the likelihood of either material errors or irregu
larities. One of the criticisms of SAS No. 53 was that
its framework did not distinguish between factors
more applicable to errors rather than fraud. The lack
of any conceptual model was believed to add to the
difficulty auditors faced in attempting to assess the
likelihood of material misstatements due to fraud when
selected fraud risk factors were found to be present.
1This literature review is not all inclusive. We focused primarily on em
pirical/archival studies and identified projects related to financial state
ment fraud versus other internal fraud activities.
2In many cases the term “fraud” in those studies was broader than merely
financial statement fraud.

Probability of F/S Fraud =
Function of (Conditions allowing fraud to be
committed, Motivation for management to
commit fraud, and an Attitude or Ethical Val
ues allowing management to commit fraud)
— Loebbecke and Willingham, 1988

While earlier research identified numerous potential
fraud risk indicators, relatively little research has
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empirically examined whether those factors are unique
to firms experiencing financial statement fraud. With
the exception of the work by Albrecht and Romney
(1986), many of these earlier studies only included
firms where financial statement fraud was alleged to
be present and excluded firms where fraud was not
present.
Validation of Fraud Risk Factors. Albrecht and
Romney (1986), followed by Albrecht and
Willingham (1993), report some of the first attempts
to validate the signaling capabilities of factors believed
to be indicative of financial statement fraud. Albrecht
and Willingham (1993) report results from a KPMG
survey of audit partners who served on 27 fraud cases
and 305 no-fraud cases. KPMG found that eight of
the 21 fraud risk factors included in SAS No. 53 were
not statistically different between the fraud and no
fraud cases. Additionally, they noted that there were
an additional nine factors not included in SAS No. 53
that appeared to be strong indicators of financial state
ment related fraud.
Building upon the KPMG study, Bell and Carcello
(1998) attempted to validate many of the fraud risk
factors identified in prior research by empirically ex
amining whether fraud risk characteristics differed
significantly for firms experiencing financial state
ment fraud relative to no-fraud firms on a multivari
ate basis. They built a predictive model for assessing
the likelihood of management fraud using logistic re
gression. The logit statistical model, derived from
the Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) conceptual
model, converts identified red flag indicators into an
assessment of the likelihood of management fraud.
They found that while many of the factors were sig
nificant on a stand-alone basis, many of the factors
were not incrementally significant when considered
together with other factors in the predictive logit
model. Their research highlights the difficulties as
sociated with considering the combination of numer
ous fraud risk factors when attempting to arrive at an
assessment of the likelihood of financial statement
fraud.
Effectiveness of Audit Tools for Fraud Detection.
Other research performed in the late 1980s and early
1990s highlights difficulties auditors have in assess

ing the overall risk of material misstatements due to
fraudulent financial reporting. Pincus (1989) found
that auditors who did not use “red flag” checklists
outperformed those who did in an experimental set
ting. In a separate study, Pincus (1990) focused on
the effects of individual auditor characteristics on
fraud detection. She found that auditors who can eas
ily dis-embed pieces of information and who cannot
tolerate ambiguous situations were more likely to iden
tify inventory misstatements due to fraud. Bernardi
(1994) extended the Pincus (1990) study and found
that client integrity and competence did not affect the
auditor’s fraud detection ability except for high-moraldevelopment managers (i.e., those who are sensitive
to ethical situations).
Hackenbrack (1993) found that auditors have differ
ent opinions about the amount of fraud risk indicated
by specific “red flag” indicators. He concluded that
one reason for this disagreement is that auditors with
different client experience (e.g., large versus small
clients) have systematically different perceptions of
the importance of a selected “red flag” factor.
Bloomfield (1997) conducted a laboratory experiment
to see how an auditor’s ability to assess fraud risk can
be influenced by the auditor’s incentives and the
strength of a client’s internal controls. He found that
the auditor’s fraud risk assessment is difficult when
the auditor faces high legal liability for audit failure
and audits a firm with strong internal controls (i.e.,
the probability of unintentional error is low).
In an effort to assist auditors in their assessment of
financial statement fraud, Eining and Dorr (1991)
developed a prototype expert system based on the
conceptual model in Loebbecke and Willingham
(1988) that combines the red flag cues into an assess
ment of management fraud risk. Using this expert
system as one decision aid, Eining et al. (1997) con
ducted a laboratory experiment with auditors using
either the expert system or two other decision aids in
their assessment of the likelihood of management
fraud. In addition to the expert system, the other two
decision aids examined in their study included a fraud
risk factor checklist and a logit predictive model simi
lar to an earlier version of the model examined by
Bell and Carcello (1998). They found that the expert
system allowed auditors to differentiate the risk of

Section VI — Overview of Findings from Academic Research 47

management fraud significantly better than auditors
using the logit model. Auditors using the logit model
discriminated the risk of management fraud signifi
cantly better than did those using the checklist.
Role of Corporate Governance. Out of the work
examining the signaling capabilities of various fraud
risk factors, there is a consistent finding that the con
trol environment of the entity under audit is impor
tant when assessing the likelihood of management
fraud. For example, Loebbecke et al. (1989) noted
that “our findings support the importance of the con
trol environment...Where controls are weak, a sig
nificant condition exists that would allow either man
agement fraud, defalcation, or an error to occur (p.
25).”
More recent studies have focused specifically on the
role of corporate governance and the assessment of
the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Beasley
(1996) examined the relation between board of direc
tor characteristics and financial statement fraud. He
found that boards of directors of fraud firms are sig
nificantly more likely to have smaller percentages of
outside nonmanagement directors on the board than
are boards of no-fraud firms, and the tenure of those
outside directors is lower and the number of other
directorships they hold is higher. Interestingly,
Beasley (1996) found no association between the pres
ence of an audit committee and the likelihood of fi
nancial statement fraud. Similarly, Dechow et al.
(1996) found that firms committing financial state
ment fraud have boards dominated by insiders. They
also found that those firms were significantly more
likely to have the CEO and chairman of the board
positions held by the same individual, with that indi
vidual often being the founder of the company.
McMullen (1996) found that entities with more reli
able financial reporting (e.g., the absence of material
errors, irregularities, and illegal acts) are significantly
more likely to have audit committees. Summers and
Sweeney (1998) found that in the presence of fraud,
insiders reduce their holdings of company stock
through high levels of selling activity. Collectively,
these studies provide some empirical evidence of the
importance of the relation between effective corpo
rate governance and the likelihood of financial state
ment fraud.

Boards of directors of fraud firms are more
likely to be composed of smaller proportions
of outside directors than are boards of no
fraud firms.

Effectiveness of SAS No. 82. Recent studies have
focused specifically on components of SAS No. 82.
Zimbelman (1997) examined the possible effects of
SAS No. 82 on auditor attention to fraud risk factors
and audit planning. His results suggest that SAS No.
82 leads auditors to accept more responsibility by in
creasing the extent of audit testing irrespective of fraud
risk and by paying greater attention to fraud risk indi
cators relating to possible financial statement fraud.
DeZoort and Lee (1998) evaluated whether the per
ceptions of users related to the responsibility of the
external auditor to detect fraud in financial statements
is greater under SAS No. 82 relative to SAS No. 53.
They found that users perceive a greater responsibil
ity on the part of the auditor to detect financial state
ment fraud under SAS No. 82 than under SAS No.
53.
Several studies have focused on factors that impede
the auditor’s ability to detect instances of financial
statement fraud. As noted by Loebbecke et al. (1989),
findings by auditors of material instances of financial
statement fraud are rare. As a result, they note that
auditors must condition themselves so that perform
ing audit after audit without encountering a material
instance of fraudulent financial reporting does not
make them so complacent that they fail to recognize
one when it is encountered.
Building upon this reality, Deshmukh et al. (1998)
applied Signal Detection Theory to the problem of
detecting management fraud. Their analysis indicates
that the auditor must accept disproportionate false
alarm rates in order to maintain audit effectiveness in
the presence of management fraud. Green and Choi
(1997) developed a neural network fraud classifica
tion model that employed financial statement related
data within the revenue cycle. Their model incorpo
rated financial statement account data that would be
examined analytically in the planning phase to deter
mine whether such data are indicative of an increased
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risk of material misstatement due to fraud. They found
that the neural network models generated few false
classifications in the absence of fraud and signaled to
the auditor to perform more additional substantive
testing when fraud was present.
"..auditors must condition themselves so that
performing audit after audit does not make
them so complacent that they fail to recog
nize one [a financial statement fraud] when
it is encountered. ”
— Loebbecke, Eining,
and Willingham, 1989

Consequences of Financial Statement Fraud. Other
studies have focused on the consequences of finan
cial statement fraud. Palmrose (1987) examined the
relation between occurrences of management fraud
and auditor litigation. She found that nearly half of
all litigation against auditors involved management
fraud, and management fraud litigation resulted in
larger payments by audit firms. Palmrose’s (1987)
findings that the existence of fraud was a significant
factor in auditor litigation are also documented by
Carcello and Palmrose (1994) and St. Pierre and
Anderson (1984). Bonner et al. (1998) extended this
analysis by examining whether financial fraud
schemes that occur more frequently and whether those
that involve fictitious transactions and events result
in a higher incidence of litigation against indepen
dent auditors. They built their study under the ex
pectation that juries and judges are more likely to hold
auditors responsible for failing to detect frauds with
these characteristics. They found some support for
the hypothesis that there is a higher incidence of au
ditor litigation when fraud schemes are frequently
occurring or involve fictitious transactions and
events.3
3They also provided some evidence about the most common types of
financial statement frauds. The most frequent fraud schemes involve
omitted or improper disclosures, fictitious or overvalued revenues or
assets, overvalued assets and undervalued expenses or liabilities, and
premature revenue recognition. While their study was also based on a
review o f AAERs, there are some differences in findings reported in our
study from those reported by Bonner et al. primarily because the time
period o f their examination and alternative sources of data used (par
ticularly litigation related databases) differed from the approach we used.
Most o f the differences are relatively minimal. The notable difference
in litigation rates against companies is highlighted in Section III.

“...auditors are more likely to be sued when
the financial statement frauds are o f a com
mon variety or when the frauds arise from
fictitious transactions. ”
— Bonner, Palmrose, and Young, 1998

As for consequences to the entity involved, Dechow
et al. (1996) found a large stock price decline for firms
when they first publicly disclose aggressive financial
reporting practices. They also found a significant
decline in the number of analysts following the firms
and a reduction in the number of institutions holding
the firm’s common stock after aggressive reporting
practices are revealed. Interestingly, Agrawal et al.
(1998) found little systematic evidence that entities
suspected or charged with fraud have unusually high
turnover among senior management or directors. In
univariate comparisons, there is some evidence that
firms committing fraud have higher managerial turn
over and inside director turnover. But, in multivari
ate tests that control for other firm attributes, the rela
tions between turnover and fraud are not significant
in the direction expected.
Even though additional research has been performed
related to the problems of financial statement fraud
since the late 1980s, there still remains a paucity of
empirical evidence about the problem of financial
statement fraud. Much of that limitation is due to the
lack of available relevant data related to actual in
stances of financial statement fraud. Much of the
needed data are not available in public documents,
and access to confidential information is generally
restricted due to the sensitive nature of fraud investi
gations and related litigation.
This research study sponsored by COSO provides
additional information that may prove useful for fu
ture research. This report titled, Fraudulent Finan
cial Reporting: 1987-1997, provides updated insights
about company and management characteristics as
sociated with known instances of financial statement
fraud. These insights should help identify issues that
can be addressed in future empirical examinations of
the financial statement fraud problem.
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